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This Article suggests the time is ripe for the United States 
Supreme Court to interpret the fair use defense of free speech 
or parody under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection 
Act (ACPA). Congress enacted the ACPA in 1999 to protect 
consumers from “cybersquatting,” which occurs when a non-
trademark holder registers domain names of trademarks and: 
(1) tries to sell the names back to the trademark holder for a 
ransom;1 (2) tries to sell the names to the highest bidder;2 or (3) 
uses the names to divert business and consumers from the 
trademark holder’s website to the non-trademark holder’s web-
site to increase revenue. 
Although published decisions from the circuit courts inter-
preting the ACPA continue to explore the marriage of trade-
mark protection with the First Amendment’s protections of do-
main names and websites as free speech, conflicting criteria 
have emerged regarding when an alleged cybersquatter can 
successfully assert the fair use defense. For example, the Tenth 
Circuit’s standard is that it must be immediately apparent to 
anyone visiting a parodic website that it was not the trademark 
owner’s website. The Fourth Circuit’s criterion, however, is 
whether the domain name at issue conveys two simultaneous, 
yet contradictory, messages: that it is the original and that it is 
not the original and is instead a parody. Such inconsistent cri-
teria have the potential to render an alleged cybersquatter vic-
torious in one circuit, yet liable in another. 
This Article’s circuit-by-circuit analysis exposes the vast 
inconsistencies among the circuit courts’ decisions and argues 
that the United States Supreme Court should, by granting cer-
tiorari, articulate the standard for the ACPA’s fair use defense 
based on free speech or parody. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The twenty-first century of daily, required use of technolo-
                                                          
 1. See Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 2. S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 5 (1999). See DaimlerChrysler v. Net Inc., 
388 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s 
Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
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gy has led to the registration of endless Internet domain names 
to advertise, market, and sell business products and services. 
In 1999, Congress passed the ACPA as a legislative tool to pro-
tect consumers from cybersquatting, which occurs when a non-
trademark holder registers domain names of trademarks and: 
(1) tries to sell the names back to the trademark holder for a 
ransom;3 (2) tries to sell the names to the highest bidder;4 or (3) 
uses the names to divert business and consumers from the 
trademark holder’s website to the non-trademark holder’s web-
site to increase revenue.5 
The ACPA prohibits cybersquatting.6 It provides in part 
that “[a] person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a 
mark . . . if  . . . that person (i) has a bad faith intent to profit 
from that mark . . . and (ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a do-
main name that . . . is identical or confusingly similar to that 
mark.”7 ACPA proponents regard this provision as a helpful 
sword in protecting the marks of registered trademark owners 
who spend years and money developing the reputation and 
goodwill of their products or services. By contrast, critics of the 
ACPA view it as a significant curtailment of free speech rights, 
especially when a domain name or website is used to criticize or 
parody another individual or company. 
Despite the clear prohibition in the ACPA, cybersquatting 
litigation has continued to occur in the federal district courts. 
In 2003, there were only ten published decisions from the fed-
eral appellate courts8 interpreting the ACPA. These decisions 
have created inconsistent and conflicting criteria regarding 
when an alleged cybersquatter can successfully use a fair use 
defense of free speech or parody to avoid liability under the 
                                                          
 3. See Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 4. S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 5 (1999). See DaimlerChrysler v. Net Inc., 
388 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s 
Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 5. S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 6. The ACPA “was Congress’ response to an 
onslaught of e-savvy entrepreneurs who amassed domain names incorporating 
protected trademarks for their own exploitations via sale or use.” Harrods Ltd. 
v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 157 F. Supp. 2d 658, 664 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
Cybersquatters often register domain names because they profit from in-
creased traffic on their own websites due to advertising income or an agree-
ment with a provider who pays them based on how many hits are received on 
their website. 
 6. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
 7. Id. 
 8. The author uses the terms “federal appellate courts” and “circuit 
courts” interchangeably. 
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ACPA.9 
Section II of this Article describes the interplay between 
the Lanham Act, which is the broader federal trademark in-
fringement statute, and the ACPA.  This section also explains 
how Congress enacted the ACPA to protect consumers from cy-
bersquatters. Section III explains the fair use defense of free 
speech and parody prior to and under ACPA. Section IV is a 
comprehensive circuit-by-circuit analysis of published decisions 
involving an alleged cybersquatter who has asserted a fair use 
defense based upon free speech or parody in an ACPA case. 
Section V concludes that the time is ripe for the United States 
Supreme Court to interpret the standard regarding when a fair 
use defense of free speech or parody will preclude liability un-
der the ACPA. 
II.  TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE LANHAM 
ACT AND THE ACPA. 
A.  TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE LANHAM ACT 
Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946 to prevent 
“commercial use of trademarks and tradenames likely to cause 
confusion as to the source of a product or service.”10 However, it 
                                                          
 9. Sue Ann Mota, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act: An 
Analysis of the Decisions from the Courts of Appeals, 21 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 355, 358 (2003). These cases included: N. Light 
Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001); Sallen v. Corinthians 
Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001); Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. 
Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000); Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 
F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001); Harrods, 302 F.3d 214; Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. 
Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2002); People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001); Virtual Works, Inc. v. 
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2001); Bird v. Parsons, 289 
F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2002); Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 
F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 10. HER v. RE/MAX First Choice, 468 F. Supp. 2d 964, 967 (S.D. Ohio 
2007). The Lanham Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125, provides in part: 
 (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any 
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, 
or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of ori-
gin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading re-
presentation of fact, which-- 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive 
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his 
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, 
or 
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was not meant to prohibit the use of a mark to communicate an 
idea or express a point of view. If a person can demonstrate 
that her use of a mark qualifies as fair use,11 such as free 
speech or a parody, she will not be liable under the Lanham 
Act.12 
B .  THE ACPA AS A CONSUMER PROTECTION TOOL TO COMBAT 
CYBERSQUATTING. 
After the 1946 enactment of the Lanham Act, but prior to 
the ACPA’s enactment in 1999, the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act was the weapon of choice against cybersquatting.13 The 
Internet explosion in the 1990s had prompted businesses and 
individuals to turn to the world wide web14 to offer their prod-
ucts online with accompanying “information about their prod-
ucts in a much more detailed fashion than [could] be done 
through a standard advertisement.”15  Therefore, the need for 
                                                          
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or 
her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he 
or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006). 
 11. For example, the Lanham Act provides that the following cannot be 
the basis for a claim of dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment: “[a]ny 
fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such 
fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of 
source for the person's own goods or services, including use in connection with 
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or ser-
vices; or (ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the 
famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(C)(3)(A) (2006). 
 12. HER, Inc. v. RE/MAX First Choice, LLC, 468 F. Supp. 2d 964, 967 
(S.D. Ohio 2007) (citing Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 
(9th Cir. 2002)). 
 13. See Mota, supra note 9, at 356; see also Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(C) (2006); S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 7 (1999). 
 14. The use of “www” that appears on the left side of a domain name and 
precedes domain names signifies that the characters to its right are a domain 
name. See PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
EXAMINATION GUIDE NO. 2-99, MARKS COMPOSED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, OF 
DOMAIN NAMES I (1999),  
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/resources/exam/guide299.jsp (“. . . the aver-
age person familiar with the Internet recognizes the format for a domain name 
and understands that . . . ‘www’ [is] a part of every URL.”). 
 15. Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d 
Cir. 2000)  (“For consumers to buy things or gather information on the Inter-
net, they need an easy way to find particular companies or brand names.”). 
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an easy-to-find domain name,16 the web address that a user 
types in to access a particular Internet website, became a ne-
cessity.17 
Companies often used their corporate name as their web-
site (for example, Microsoft uses www.microsoft.com) for three 
reasons: (1) to make consumers’ searches for a website as easy 
as possible because uncertain customers may guess that a par-
ticular company’s website can be located by correctly18 typing 
in the company’s name as a domain name;19 (2) to discourage 
consumers from giving up on the search for a company’s web-
                                                          
 16. The ACPA defines a domain name as “any alphanumeric designation 
which is registered with or assigned by any domain name registrar, domain 
name registry, or other domain name registration authority as part of an elec-
tronic address on the Internet.” H.R. REP. NO. 106–412, at 4 (1999). Domain 
names generally consist of two parts: a top level extension, such as .com or 
.org, and a second level extension, such as “pepsi” in pepsi.com. See Jian Xiao, 
The First Wave of Cases Under the ACPA, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 159, 
164–65 (2002). See generally Sporty’s Farm, 202 F.3d at 492 (stating that, as of 
February 2, 2000, the Internet was generally divided into six types of top-level 
domains: (1) .edu for educational institutions; (2) .org for nongovernmental 
and noncommercial organizations; (3) .gov for governmental entities; (4) .net 
for networks; (5) .com for commercial users; and (6) a nation-specific domain 
(e.g, .us for the United States)). An explanation of Internet terminology also 
appears at http://www.verisign.com/nds/naming/glossary (last visited Novem-
ber 25, 2009). 
 17. See Xiao, supra note 16, at 159. 
 18. Some cybersquatters purposely register “a common misspelling of 
another’s trademark with the intent of diverting Internet users seeking the 
mark owner’s website to the infringer’s website.” Timothy Marsh, Shields v. 
Zuccarini: The Role of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in 
Fighting Typosquatting, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 683, 683 (2002). 
 19. Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Cardservice Int’l v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. Va. 1997)); 
see also Beverly v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. C-98-0337-VRW, 1998 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8888, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 1998). In fact, “[o]ne of the cardin-
al rules for domain names is ‘keep it short’[because a] shorter domain name is 
easier to remember.” ROBERT A. BADGLEY, DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES § 2:09[A] 
(Aspen Publishers 2002). Moreover, an Internet user who does not know a 
company’s domain name will likely use a search engine to find all the web 
pages on the Internet containing a particular word or phrase, such as the 
company’s name. This search usually produces a lengthy list of websites for 
the user to look through to find a particular website. See Sporty’s Farm, 202 
F.3d at 493; see also H.R. REP. NO. 106–412, at 5 (1999). Thus, many “website 
owners have a great incentive to use any means necessary to appear promi-
nently on many keyword searches, including filling their sites with keywords 
that are in no way relevant to their site’s subject matter.” Robert Nupp, Con-
current Use of Trademarks on the Internet: Reconciling the Concept of Geo-
graphically Delimited Trademarks with the Reality of the Internet, 64 OHIO ST. 
L. J. 617, 658 (2003) (footnote omitted). 
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site if they do not believe a company has a website;20 and (3) to 
improve consumer recognition and goodwill by alerting con-
sumers as to which company owns a particular website.21 
When the ACPA22 amended the Lanham Act in 1999, it 
generally provided that “a trademark owner asserting a claim 
under the ACPA must establish the following: (1) it has a valid 
trademark entitled to protection; (2) its mark is distinctive or 
famous; (3) the defendant’s domain name is identical or confu-
singly similar to,23 or in the case of famous marks, dilutive of, 
the owner’s mark; (4) the defendant used, registered, or traf-
ficked in the domain name; (5) with a bad faith intent to prof-
it.”24 The ACPA was intended to protect consumers unknowing-
ly diverted to a cybersquatter’s website, so that they are not 
confused as to the true source or sponsorship of goods and ser-
vices on a website. It also aimed to protect the value of business 
brand names and trademarks by preventing the loss of reve-
nue25 and consumer confidence when consumers are diverted to 
                                                          
 20. Panavision Int’l,141 F.3d at 1327 (quoting Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 
993 F. Supp. 282, 306–07 (D.N.J. 1998)). 
 21. Id. at 1327 n.8 (citing Cardservice Int’l, 950 F. Supp. at 741). After all, 
“[t]he property interest in a mark that trademark law seeks to protect is con-
sumer recognition—preferably favorable recognition (i.e., goodwill).” Nupp, 
supra note 19, at 618; see, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:30 (4th ed. 2000). 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
 23. Courts typically analyze the second level extension domain, such as 
“cocacola” in “cocacola.com” when analyzing whether that domain name is 
“identical or confusingly similar to a given mark” for ACPA purposes.  Virtual 
Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 270 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 24. DaimlerChrysler v. The Net Inc., 388 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(citing Ford Motor Co. v. Catalonette, 342 F.3d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
 25. S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 6 (1999). The House of Representatives also 
explained that: 
 Cyberpiracy can hurt businesses in a number of ways. First, a cyber-
pirate’s expropriation of a mark as part of a domain name prevents 
the trademark owner from using the mark as part of its domain 
name. As a result, consumers seeking a trademark owner’s Web site 
are diverted elsewhere, which means lost business opportunities for 
the trademark owner. A cyberpirate’s use may also blur the distinc-
tive quality of a mark and, when linked to certain types of Internet 
activities such as pornography, may also tarnish the mark. Finally, 
businesses are required to police and enforce their trademark rights 
by preventing unauthorized use, or risk losing those rights entirely. 
H.R. REP. NO. 106-412 (1999); see also Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 267 (citing 
Sporty’s Farm, L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt. Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 
2000) (“Cybersquatting is profitable because while it is inexpensive for a cy-
bersquatter to register the mark of an established company as a domain name, 
such companies are often vulnerable to being forced into paying substantial 
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a cybersquatter’s website.26 However, the ACPA was not meant 
to “give companies the right to fence off every possible combina-
tion of letters that bears any similarity to a protected  
mark … .”27 
III.  THE FAIR USE DEFENSE OF FREE SPEECH OR 
PARODY PRIOR TO THE ACPA. 
To hold a cybersquatter liable under the ACPA, a court 
must determine that a domain name holder had a bad faith in-
tent to profit from the mark.28 The ACPA lists nine, nonex-
haustive factors29 to assist courts in their determination of 
whether a bad faith intent to profit existed.30 The fourth bad 
                                                          
sums to get their names back.”). 
 26. Cybersquatters often damage marks by putting harmful material, 
such as pornography, on a website to increase the probability that they will 
get a hefty ransom from the mark owner who does not want its mark dam-
aged. When the Senate was contemplating the ACPA, they were informed 
about a child who accidentally typed in www.dosney.com, instead of 
www.disney.com, on the Internet and pulled up a pornography website. See 
H.R. REP. NO. 106–412 at 5 (explaining the purpose and providing a sum-
mary of the Act). 
 27. See Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 271; see also Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 
F.3d 534, 543 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that Telescan’s domain names, such as 
www.peterbiltnewstruck.com had the same appearance as PACCAR’s domain 
name www.peterbilt.com despite the addition of characters to the domain 
name because the added characters did not “eliminate the likelihood of confu-
sion for ACPA purposes”) (quoting PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs. L.L.C., 
319 F.3d 243, 252 (6th Cir.2003) overruled in part by KP Permanent Make-Up, 
Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004)). The court also noted 
that the ACPA was meant to “prevent the expropriation of protected marks in 
cyberspace and to abate the consumer confusion resulting therefrom.” Virtual 
Works, 238 F.3d at 271. 
 28. At least one circuit court has determined that the standard for proving 
“bad faith” is by a preponderance of the evidence. Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Inter-
net Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 225 (4th Cir. 2002). The Fourth Circuit rea-
soned that “[b]ecause Congress spelled out the bad faith factors so thoroughly, 
we expect that Congress would have explicitly imposed a heightened burden of 
proof had it intended for one to apply.” Id. at 227. 
 29. The ACPA provides nine factors that may be considered in determin-
ing whether a cybersquatter has a “bad faith intent to profit” from a mark. 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
 30. These nine “factors are given to courts as a guide, not as a substitute 
for careful thinking about whether the conduct at issue is motivated by a bad 
faith intent to profit.” Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 
806, 811 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Harrods, 302 F.3d at 234 (“[T]here is no sim-
ple formula for evaluating and weighing these factors . . . courts do not simply 
count up which party has more factors in its favor after the evidence is in.”). 
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faith factor, known as the “fair use defense,” provides that the 
domain name holder’s “bona fide noncommercial or fair use of 
the mark in a site accessible under the domain name” be consi-
dered by a court.31 The fair use defense was enacted to protect 
permissible First Amendment speech, such as comparative ad-
vertising, comment, criticism, parody, and news reporting.32 
The fair use defense also has a second basis in the ACPA’s 
safe harbor exception, which provides that a bad faith intent to 
profit “shall not be found in any case in which the court deter-
mines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to 
believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or oth-
erwise lawful.”33 Thus, if an accused cybersquatter asserts the 
fair use defense, a court must consider such defense twice in its 
judicial analysis: first, under the fair use defense governing 
whether he or she had a bad faith intent to profit from the 
mark and second, under the ACPA’s safe harbor exception.34 
Long before Congress enacted the ACPA into law, parodies 
were recognized as “a form of artistic expression, protected by 
                                                          
 31. Regarding the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, “‘noncommercial use’ 
refers to a use that consists entirely of noncommercial, or fully constitutionally 
protected, speech.” Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th 
Cir. 2002); see H.R. REP. NO. 106–412, at 11 (1999). The House of Represent-
atives, in enacting the ACPA, further explained that “the use of a domain 
name for purposes of comparative advertising, comment, criticism, parody, 
news reporting, etc., even where done for profit, would not alone satisfy the 
bad-faith intent requirement . . . . This factor is not intended to create a loo-
phole that otherwise might swallow the bill, however, by allowing a domain 
name registrant to evade application of the Act by merely putting up a nonin-
fringing site under an infringing domain name.” Id. 
 32. Some have argued that the ACPA itself violates the First Amendment. 
See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 277 (5th Cir. 
2002). In E. & J. Gallo, Spider Webs argued on appeal that the ACPA was un-
constitutional because it violated the First Amendment, but since it failed to 
raise this issue before the trial court, the Fifth Circuit determined that the 
issue had been waived. Id. at 277, n. 4. Other courts have addressed the com-
peting interests of the First Amendment and the ACPA. See Lamparello v. 
Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Congress left little doubt that it 
did not intend for trademark laws to impinge the First Amendment rights of 
critics and commentators.”); see also Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain 
Names, 157 F. Supp. 2d 658, 673 (E.D. Va. 2001) (“To ensure that speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment is not jeopardized by the ACPA, a court should 
consider a registrant's ‘legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a 
website that is accessible under the domain name at issue’” (citing 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1125(d)(B)(i)(IV) (West Supp. 2000)). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (2006). 
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the First Amendment,” that deserved considerable freedom35 
but can depend on a lack of confusion to be effective.36 A good 
trademark parody creates “little likelihood of confusion, since 
the humor lies in the difference between the original and the 
parody.”37 An unsuccessful parody is one that requires a user to 
read a website’s content before the user discovers that the do-
main name was meant to be a parody.38 In other words, in a 
trademark infringement case, courts generally consider wheth-
er a consumer would, from the first moment, realize that Prod-
uct A was not Product B in her analysis of whether something 
is a parody is successful. This determines if the attempted pa-
rody falls under the umbrella of the fair use defense, which cir-
cumvents liability.39 
Prior to the ACPA, parodists had historically been success-
ful in the First, Second, and Tenth Circuits in trademark in-
fringement actions. In L.L. Bean v. Drake Publishing, Inc., 811 
F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987),  Plaintiff L.L. Bean (L.L. Bean) was 
a mail order catalog publisher that marketed outdoor and 
sports apparel40 who sued Drake Publishing, Inc. (Drake) for 
alleged trademark infringement and dilution after Drake pub-
lished a parodic catalog titled “L.L. Beam’s Sex-Catalog” that 
contained sexual entertainment.41 Although the district court 
denied L.L. Bean’s request for a temporary restraining order, it 
issued an injunction and subsequently granted summary judg-
                                                          
 35. Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 
F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 
545 (2d Cir. 1964)). Congress envisioned that the ACPA would balance the in-
terests of trademark owners with the interests of domain name registrants 
engaged in traditional free speech such as criticism, comment, and news re-
porting. S. REP. NO. 106–140, at 10. 
 36. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 503 (2d 
Cir. 1996). 
 37. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
970 (10th Cir. 1996); see also OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. 
Supp. 2d 176, 191 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 38. Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1134–35 (D. 
Colo. 2000). 
 39. Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 496–97. After all, the Lanham Act did not re-
quire that “the cover of a parody carry a disclaimer that it is not produced by 
the subject of the parody.” Id. at 496. 
 40. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 27–34 (1st Cir. 
1987) (“L.L. Bean II”). 
 41. See id. at 27. L.L. Bean also sued Drake for unfair competition, decep-
tive trade practices, interference with prospective business advantage, and 
trade libel. Id. 
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ment in L.L. Bean’s favor on the trademark dilution claim.42 
The district court found that: (1) Drake’s parodic catalog had 
undermined L.L. Bean’s trademark’s goodwill and reputation 
such that it tarnished the marks; and (2) the publication of 
Drake’s catalog had harmed L.L. Bean.43 While Drake argued 
that its catalog was a parody, the district court disagreed, find-
ing that a “parody per se is not protected from [an] injunction 
under the antidilution statute.”44  Therefore, the district court 
issued an injunction prohibiting future publication or distribu-
tion of the L.L. Beam Sex Catalog.45 
On appeal, the First Circuit analyzed whether enjoining 
Drake’s parodic catalog violated the First Amendment46 and 
found that: 
[Drake’s] parody constitutes an editorial or artistic, rather than a 
commercial, use of [L.L. Bean’s] mark. The article was labeled as 
“humor” and “parody” in the magazine’s table of contents section; it 
took up two pages in a one-hundred-page issue; neither the article nor 
appellant’s trademark was featured on the front or back cover of the 
magazine. Drake did not use [L.L.] Bean’s mark to identify or pro-
mote goods or services to consumers; it never intended to market the 
“products” displayed in the parody.47 
Therefore, the First Circuit reversed the injunction and 
summary judgment award against Drake, because “[d]enying 
parodists the opportunity to poke fun at symbols and names 
which have become woven into the fabric of our daily life, would 
constitute a serious curtailment of a protected form of expres-
sion.”48 
A few months later, in Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg 
Wyld, Ltd, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s judg-
ment in favor of Defendants who made “Lardashe” jeans featur-
ing a pig head logo for larger women. Plaintiff, a maker of “Jor-
dache” jeans featuring a horse head, argued that the 
“Lardashe” jeans closely resembled its own and sued Defen-
dants for allegedly violating the Lanham Act.49 The district 
                                                          
 42. See id. L.L. Bean’s trademark dilution claim was asserted under 
Maine law. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (1981). Id.; see also L.L. Bean 
v. Drake Publishers, 625 F. Supp. 1531 (D. Me. 1986) rev’d 811 F.2d 26 (1st 
Cir. 1987) (“L.L. Bean I”). 
 43. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Pub., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1531 (D. Me. 1986). 
 44. L.L. Bean I at 1536 (emphasis in original). 
 45. Id. at 1539. 
 46. L.L. Bean II at 28. 
 47. L.L. Bean II at 32. 
 48. L.L. Bean II at 34. 
 49. Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 
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court entered judgment for Defendants because there was “no 
likelihood of confusion between the Jordache trademark and 
the Lardashe trademark” and Defendant’s “intent was to em-
ploy a name that, to some extent, parodied or played upon the 
established trademark Jordache.”50 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
judgment in favor of Defendants while enunciating the criteria 
for a successful parody to preclude liability under the Lanham 
Act: 
[A] parody is an attempt ‘to derive benefit from the reputation’ of the 
owner of the mark . . . if only because no parody could be made with-
out the initial mark.  The benefit to the one making the parody, how-
ever, arises from the humorous association, not from public confusion 
as to the source of the marks.  A parody relies upon a difference from 
the original mark, presumably a humorous difference, in order to pro-
duce its desired effect.51 
The Second Circuit subsequently held that a parody that 
causes only a “slight” risk of confusion is also protected by free 
speech and will not form the basis for a Lanham Act violation.52 
In Cliffs Notes v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 
886 F.2d 490, 492–93 (2d Cir. 1989), Plaintiff Cliffs Notes 
(Cliffs Notes), a publisher of condensed study guides, sought an 
injunction and other relief against Defendant Bantam Double-
day Dell Publishing Group, Inc. (Bantam) after Bantam distri-
buted a paperback titled “Spy Notes” which was a parody of, 
and satirized, the Cliffs Notes study guides.53 Cliffs Notes ar-
gued that Bantam’s actions violated the Lanham Act.54 The dis-
trict court granted a preliminary injunction against Bantam, 
finding that since there existed “a profound likelihood of confu-
                                                          
1987). Jordache also sued Defendants under the New Mexico Trademark Act, 
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3-1 to 57-3-14 (1987) and common law. Jordache, 828 
F.2d at 1484. Their Lanham Act claims were based on 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–
1127. Id. at 1484. 
 50. Id. at 1483, 1485 (emphasis added).  The court also noted that the 
standard under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) was whether the un-
authorized use of a reproduction, copy, or imitation of a registered trademark 
was “likely to cause confusion” with the registered trademark. Id. at 1484. 
 51. Id. at 1486 (quoting Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 
431 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
 52. Cliffs Notes. Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F. 2d 
490 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 53. Id. at 491–92. 
 54. Cliffs Notes also asserted that Bantam violated the New York common 
law of unfair competition and § 368-d of the New York General Business Law. 
Id. at 493. 
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sion” between the covers of Spy Notes and Cliffs Notes, Cliffs 
Notes had met its burden to show an irreparable injury and a 
likelihood of success on the merits.55 Therefore, the district 
court enjoined Bantam from continuing to distribute Spy Notes 
with the offending cover at issue.56 
On appeal the Second Circuit Court vacated the district 
court’s injunction because the: 
[P]arody cover of Spy Notes, although it surely conjures up the origi-
nal and goes to great lengths to use some of the identical colors and 
aspects of the cover design of Cliffs Notes, raises only a slight risk of 
consumer confusion that is outweighed by the public interest in free 
expression, especially in a form of expression that must to some ex-
tent resemble the original.57 
Before the ACPA became law in 1999, parodists had also 
argued that their use of parodies could not subject them to lia-
bility because such use was noncommercial.58 In Planned Pa-
renthood Federation of America v. Bucci, Plaintiff Planned Pa-
renthood Federation of America, Inc. (Planned Parenthood) 
sued Defendant, Richard Bucci (Bucci) for alleged Lanham Act 
violations. Planned Parenthood, a reproductive health care or-
ganization that operated a website at www.ppfa.org to educate 
users about resources, sexual health, and abortion, sought an 
injunction against Bucci.59 Bucci was the host of “Catholic Ra-
dio” and an anti-abortion activist who registered the 
www.plannedparenthood.com domain name.60 Bucci created a 
website at that domain name which contained anti-abortion 
sentiments and links to communicate with an anti-abortion au-
thor.61 While Bucci admitted he wanted to attract Internet us-
ers who were looking for Planned Parenthood’s website,62 he 
                                                          
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 497 (emphasis added). At least one circuit court has noted that 
certain domain names themselves may constitute protected speech. See 
Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 586 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(concluding that “while we hold that the existing gTLDs [generic top level do-
mains] do not constitute protected speech under the First Amendment, we do 
not preclude the possibility that certain domain names . . . could indeed 
amount to protected speech.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629, 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997), aff’d, No. 97-7492, 1998 
U.S. App. LEXIS 22179 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1998). 
 59. Id. at *1–2. 
 60. Id. at *3. 
 61. Id. at *3–5. 
 62. Id. at *1–2. 
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argued that his actions fell outside the purview of the Lanham 
Act because his actions constituted noncommercial speech.63 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York disa-
greed, noting that: 
[Bucci’s] use is commercial because of its effect on [Planned Parent-
hood’s] activities. First, [Bucci] has appropriated [Planned Parent-
hood’s] mark in order to reach an audience of Internet users who 
want to reach [Planned Parenthood’s] services and viewpoint, inter-
cepting them and misleading them in an attempt to offer his own po-
litical message. Second, [Bucci’s] appropriation not only provides In-
ternet users with competing and directly opposing information, but 
also prevents those users from reaching [Planned Parenthood] and its 
services and message. In that way, [Bucci’s] use is classically competi-
tive: he has taken [Planned Parenthood’s] mark as his own in order to 
purvey his Internet services—his web site—to an audience intending 
to access [Planned Parenthood’s] services.64 
The district court also found that Bucci’s homepage using 
Planned Parenthood’s mark as its address “convey[ed] the im-
pression to Internet users that [Planned Parenthood] is the 
sponsor of [Bucci’s] web site” and thus, issued an injunction 
against him.65 In a concise, non-substantive opinion, the Second 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.66 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS 
REGARDING WHEN THE FAIR USE DEFENSE OF FREE 
SPEECH OR PARODY CAN PRECLUDE LIABILITY UNDER 
THE ACPA. 
After the ACPA’s inception, accused cybersquatters began 
to assert that their use of domain names and corresponding 
websites in a parodic or commentary manner fell under the 
                                                          
 63. Id. at *10. 
 64. Id. at *6. 
 65. Id. The district court also disagreed with Bucci’s reliance on Panavi-
sion International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996), “for 
the proposition that registering a domain name is not a commercial use within 
the meaning of the anti-dilution provision of the Lanham Act.” Planned Pa-
renthood, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *21. The district court observed that the 
Panavision court noted that the “exception for noncommercial use of a famous 
mark is intended to prevent courts from enjoining constitutionally-protected 
speech.” Id. at *21 (quoting Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1303). However, the 
district court stated that whether Bucci’s use of the mark was commercial 
within the meaning of the Lanham Act was a distinct question from whether 
Bucci’s use of the mark was protected by the First Amendment and that its 
conclusion only decided the second question. Id. at *21–22. 
 66. Planned Parenthood, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22179. 
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ACPA’s fair use defense and safe harbor exceptions.  The feder-
al appellate courts were soon faced with cases involving claims 
by alleged cybersquatters that their actions constituted a fair 
use which precluded a finding of liability, forcing the courts to 
begin articulating the standards for a successful fair use de-
fense in dispute over domain names.67 
A.  FIRST CIRCUIT 
In Northern Light Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights 
Club, Plaintiff, Northern Light Technology, sued Defendants, 
Northern Lights Club, Jeff Burgar, and 641271 Alberta Ltd., 
for alleged ACPA violations.68 Plaintiff had registered “North-
ern Light” as a trademark in 1996 and owned and used the 
domain name, www.northernlight.com.69 Defendant Jeff Bur-
gar’s business included “register[ing] thousands of ‘catchy’ do-
main names—i.e., Internet addresses appropriating, in identic-
al or slightly modified form, the names of popular people and 
organizations.”70 Burgar was also the President of Defendant 
Northern Lights Club, a member-less association whose mis-
sion was to “bring together devotees of the Northern Lights.”71 
Defendants registered the www.northernlights.com domain 
name and offered email accounts (such as 
John.Doe@northernlights.com), although originally, users who 
tried to locate the domain name on the Internet found no such 
website.72 Several years later, Defendants established a subs-
tantive website at www.northernlights.com, featuring a site-
search function with links to Northern Lights Community 
members and to Plaintiff’s www.northernlight.com website.73 
                                                          
 67. For brevity purposes, this Article references only the published deci-
sions from the federal appellate courts where the court spent a significant por-
tion of its opinion analyzing the fair use defense or the First Amendment in an 
ACPA case. 
 68. N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 236 F.3d 57, 59–60 (1st Cir. 
2001). Plaintiff originally sued Defendants for alleged violations of unfair 
competition, trademark infringement, and trademark dilution. Id. at 59–60. 
Plaintiff subsequently amended its complaint to include an ACPA claim but 
dropped its federal and state trademark dilution claims and a state law claim 
of unfair competition. Id. at 60. 
 69. Id. at 58. 
 70. Id. at 59. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. The court also noted that Plaintiff had not acquiesced to its web-
site being listed on Defendants’ website. Id. 
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The district court determined that Plaintiff was likely to 
succeed on its ACPA claim because Plaintiff’s domain name 
and Defendants’ domain name were confusingly similar and 
there was evidence that Defendants had the requisite bad faith 
intent to profit from their use of Plaintiff’s mark.74 Therefore, 
the court issued a preliminary injunction, requiring Defendants 
to post a disclaimer on its www.northernlights.com website.75 
Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing in part 
that (1) the district court had erred in determining that Plain-
tiff was likely to succeed on the merits of its claims; and (2) the 
preliminary injunction violated their First Amendment rights 
to free speech.76 Defendants denied that they had a bad faith 
intent to profit, arguing that their conduct fell within the 
ACPA’s “safe harbor” exception as they had “believed and had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the 
[www.northernlights.com] domain name was a fair use or oth-
erwise lawful.”77 
The First Circuit disagreed, finding that Defendants’ “well-
established pattern of registering multiple domain names con-
taining famous trademarks, such as rollingstones.com, evi-
nrude.com, and givenchy.com, has been made highly relevant 
to the determination of bad faith.”78 Thus, it determined that 
the district court properly found that Defendants had acted in 
bad faith.79 Regarding Defendants’ First Amendment argu-
ment, the First Circuit declined to address that issue on appeal 
because “[D]efendants only obliquely pressed their First 
Amendment argument before the district court.”80 Therefore, 
the First Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction against 
Defendants.81 
                                                          
 74. Id. at 61 (citing N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 
96, 115–120 (D. Mass. 2000)). 
 75. Id. at 58. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 64 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii)). 
 78. Id. at 65. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 58. The court did not find that Defendants’ First Amendment 
argument was waived on appeal; rather, it expressly stated that such argu-
ment could be made in the district court when a trial on the merits was held. 
Id. at 66. 
 81. Id. at 58, 65. 
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B.  THIRD CIRCUIT 
In Shields v. Zuccarini, the Third Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s award of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff 
and trademark owner Joseph Shields (Shields) and against al-
leged cybersquatter, Defendant John Zuccarini (Zuccarini).82 
Shields, a graphic artist who created cartoons using the name 
“Joe Cartoon,” registered the www.joecartoon.com domain 
name to operate a website selling his merchandise.83 Zuccarini 
was a domain name wholesaler who registered the following 
five domain names: www.joescartoon.com, www.joecarton.com, 
www.joescartons.com, www.joescartoons.com, and 
www.cartoonjoe.com.84 Originally, when an Internet user would 
type in any of Zuccarini’s five domain names, advertisements 
for other websites and credit card companies appeared.85 When 
a user was in the website of these domain names, they could 
exit only if they clicked on a series of advertisements.86 Zucca-
rini received money from advertisers for every click on these 
websites.87 
Shields sued Zuccarini for alleged ACPA and unfair compe-
tition violations.88 After Shields initiated his lawsuit, Zuccarini 
changed the content of his websites to “political protest” pages 
describing the litigation and criticizing www.joecartoon.com for 
“depict[ing] the mutilation and killing of animals in a cartoon 
format[.]”89 The district court issued a preliminary injunction in 
Shields’ favor, ordered that Zuccarini’s five domain names be 
transferred to Shields, and required Zuccarini “to refrain from 
                                                          
 82. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 83. Id. at 479. 
 84. Id. at 479–80. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 480. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 480. Zuccarini’s political protest pages included the following 
statement: 
 joecartoon.com is a web site that depicts the mutilation and killing of 
animals in a shockwave based cartoon format—many children are in-
ticed [sic] to the web site, not knowing what is really there and then 
encouraged to join in the mutilation and killing through use of the 
shockwave cartoon presented to them. . . . As the owner of this do-
main name, I am being sued by joecartoon.com for $100,000 so he can 
use this domain to direct more kids to a web site that not only desen-
sitizes children to killing animals, but makes it seem like great fun 
and games. 
Id. (quoting Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 635–36 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). 
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‘using or abetting the use of’ the infringing domain names or 
any other domain names substantially similar to Shields’ 
marks.”90 
However, the district court denied Shields’ original motion 
for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue of material fact 
existed on the ACPA claim.91 Even though Zuccarini admitted 
he registered variations of www.joecartoon.com because they 
were confusingly similar, he also claimed “that his use of the 
variations was fair and lawful, and that he is using the domain 
names ‘for the purpose of exercising his First Amendment 
rights of protest against the Plaintiff’s domain which has objec-
tionable and offensive materials.’”92  Shields subsequently filed 
a second motion for summary judgment, which the district 
court granted after finding that “Zuccarini had registered five 
variations of Shields’ name willfully, in bad faith, and in viola-
tion of the [ACPA].”93 
On appeal, the Third Circuit noted that Shields needed to 
prove the following to prevail on his ACPA claim: (1) “Joe Car-
toon” is a distinctive or famous mark entitled to protection;94 (2) 
Zuccarini’s domain names are identical or confusingly similar 
to Shields’ mark; and (3) Zuccarini registered the domain 
names with the bad faith intent to profit from them.95 The 
Third Circuit determined that Shields’ trademark, and his 
www.joecartoon.com domain name, were worthy of ACPA pro-
tection.96  It also found that Zuccarini’s five domain names 
were confusingly similar to www.joecartoon.com97 because Zuc-
carini purposely intended “to register a domain name in antici-
pation that consumers would make a mistake [in the spelling of 
the domain name], thereby increasing the number of hits his 
site would receive, and consequently, the number of advertising 
dollars he would gain.”98 
                                                          
 90. Id. at 481. 
 91. Id. at 480. 
 92. Id. at 480 n.2. 
 93. Id. at 481. 
 94. The court determined that Shields’ “Cartoon Joe” mark was distinc-
tive and his www.joecartoon.com website was famous. Id. at 482–83. 
 95. Id. at 482; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2006); cf. Sporty’s Farm 
L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt. Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497–99 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 96. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 484. The court also found that Zuccarini’s five domain names 
were “confusingly similar” because of the strong similarities between these 
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As to the issue of whether Zuccarini acted with a bad faith 
intent to profit, the Third Circuit determined that Zuccarini’s 
actions did not constitute a noncommercial or fair use because 
he registered these domain names to divert customers from vi-
siting Shield’s website and to harm “the goodwill associated 
with [Shields’] . . . mark.”99 
Zuccarini unsuccessfully tried to invoke the protection of 
the ACPA’s safe harbor provision by asserting his First 
Amendment rights justified his “protest pages.”100  The Third 
Circuit disagreed, finding that Zuccarini’s actions were a “spu-
rious explanation cooked up purely for this suit.”101 The Court 
also noted that when Zuccarini originally registered his five 
domain names, he had used them for commercial purposes; he 
did not change them into “protest pages” until the lawsuit had 
been filed.102 Thus, the Third Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s summary judgment award against Zuccarini.103 
C.  FOURTH CIRCUIT 
In Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 
Plaintiff Virtual Works, Inc. (Virtual Works) registered the 
domain name, www.vw.net, used it in connection with a busi-
ness for two years, and then sought to sell it to the highest bid-
der.104 Defendant Volkswagen of America (VW) became aware 
of Virtual Works’ intentions to sell www.vw.net and tried to 
unsuccessfully enforce a dispute resolution process through 
Network Solutions.105 Virtual Works filed an action for declara-
                                                          
five domain names and www.joecartoon.com based upon the “likely misspel-
lings of famous marks or personal names.” Id. at 483. 
 99. Id. at 485; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
 100. Shields, 254 F.3d at 485. The safe harbor provision of § 
1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) states that “bad faith intent . . . shall not be found in any case 
in which the court determines that the person believed and had reasonable 
grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise 
lawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 101. Shields, 254 F.3d at 485 (quoting Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 
634, 640 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). 
 102. Id. at 485–86 (3d Cir. 2001). The court was not aware of any “authori-
ty providing that a defendant’s ‘fair use’ of a distinctive or famous mark only 
after the filing of a complaint alleging infringement can absolve that defen-
dant of liability for his earlier unlawful activities.” Id. at 486. 
 103. Id. at 479. 
 104. Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 266–67 
(4th Cir. 2001). 
 105. Id. Network Solutions was the “company authorized by the govern-
ment [at that time] to serve as a registrar for Internet domain names.” Id. 
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tory judgment against VW, and VW counterclaimed, accusing 
Virtual Works of cybersquatting, trademark dilution, and in-
fringement.106  Because Virtual Works had registered 
www.vw.net in 1996, before Congress enacted the ACPA, VW’s 
only available remedy for Virtual Works’ alleged ACPA viola-
tion was “to have the [www.vw.net] domain name transferred 
to the owner of the mark or canceled.”107 
VW moved for summary judgment on all of its counter-
claims, which the district court granted after finding that “Vir-
tual Works had a bad faith intent to profit from the vw.net do-
main name and that its use of vw.net diluted and infringed 
upon the VW mark.”108 The district court also ordered Virtual 
Works to give VW the rights to vw.net.109 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed that the district 
court’s finding of bad faith intent to profit by Virtual Works 
was supported by the evidence. Circumstantial evidence in-
cluded: “1) the famousness of the VW mark; 2) the similarity of 
vw.net to the VW mark; 3) the admission that Virtual Works 
never once did business as VW nor identified itself as such; and 
4) the availability of vwi.org and vwi.net at the time Virtual 
Works registered vw.net.”110 The direct evidence consisted of: 1) 
statements made by two Virtual Works executives regarding 
selling vw.net to Volkswagen in the future; and 2) Virtual 
Work’s offer to Volkswagen that “vw.net would be sold to the 
highest bidder if Volkswagen did not make an offer within 
twenty-four hours.”111 
The Fourth Circuit also determined that VW’s mark was 
famous, that Virtual Works had registered, trafficked in, and 
used vw.net, and that vw.net was confusingly similar to the 
                                                          
 106. Id. at 267. 
 107. Id. at 268; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006). 
 108. Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 267 (citing Virtual Works, Inc. v. Network 
Solutions, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 845 (E.D. Va. 2000)). The Fourth Circuit noted 
that two Virtual Works executives had “talked about Volkswagen and decided 
that [they] would use the domain name for [the] company, but if Volkswagen 
offered to work out a deal for services or products, that [they] would sell it to 
[Volkswagen] for a lot of money.” Id. at 266. 
 109. Id. at 269. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 269–70. However, the Fourth Circuit did observe that “domain 
names that are abbreviations of a company’s formal name are quite common. 
To view the use of such names as tantamount to bad faith would chill Internet 
entrepreneurship with the prospect of endless litigation.” Id. at 269. 
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famous VW mark.112 Nor could Virtual Works cloak itself with 
the ACPA’s safe harbor provision because Virtual Works con-
fessed its “hope of profiting from consumer confusion of vw.net 
with the VW mark.”113 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s finding that Virtual Works violated the 
ACPA.114 
A few months later, the Fourth Circuit rendered its deci-
sion in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Dough-
ney, Plaintiff, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 
(PETA), an animal rights organization with the website 
www.peta.com, sued Defendant, Michael Doughney (Dough-
ney), for cybersquatting.115 Doughney registered the 
www.peta.org domain name and created a website at that do-
main name titled “People Eating Tasty Animals.”116 The 
www.peta.org website contained (1) a “People Eating Tasty An-
imals” caption; (2) references that the site was for those who 
enjoyed hunting, eating meat, and wearing fur and leather; (3) 
links to anti-PETA organizations; and (4) an opportunity to “ex-
it immediately” which led users to PETA’s official 
www.peta.com website.117 
Doughney argued that his website was a constitutionally 
protected parody of PETA, that he did not act in bad faith with 
an intent to profit, and that he believed his use of PETA’s mark 
was lawful.118 The district court disagreed, explaining that: 
[O]nly after arriving at . . . [the www.peta.org] web site could the web 
site browser determine that this was not a web site owned, controlled 
                                                          
 112. Id. at 270–71; cf. Shade’s Landing, Inc. v. Williams, 76 F. Supp. 2d 
983, 990 (D. Minn. 1999) (“Because all domain names include one of these ex-
tensions, the distinctions between a domain name ending with ‘.com’ and the 
same name ending with ‘.net’ is not highly significant.”). 
 113. Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 270; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 114. Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 266. The court did not address Volkswa-
gen’s claims of trademark infringement or dilution since “Virtual Works’ viola-
tion of the ACPA supports the remedy Volkswagen seeks [namely, the rights 
to vw.net].” Id. 
 115. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 
359, 362 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 116. Id. at 362–363. PETA also sought injunctive relief and sued Doughney 
for service mark infringement, unfair competition, and dilution. Id. at 363. 
 117. Id. Doughney eventually moved his website to www.mtd.com/tasty 
where he added a disclaimer indicating there was no affiliation with PETA. Id. 
 118. Id. at 369. The ACPA’s safe harbor provision states that bad faith in-
tent “shall not be found in any case in which the court determines that the 
person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the do-
main name was fair use or otherwise lawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) 
(2006). 
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or sponsored by PETA. Therefore, the two images: (1) the famous 
PETA name and (2) the ‘People Eating Tasty Animals’ website was 
not a parody because [they were not] simultaneous.119 
The district court also determined that Doughney’s use of 
PETA’s mark was commercial and thus, his use of PETA’s 
mark was neither noncommercial nor fair and further, that 
Doughney did not have reasonable grounds to believe that his 
use of PETA’s mark was lawful, and thus, it granted summary 
judgment in favor of PETA.120 
On appeal, Doughney did not dispute that his 
www.peta.org domain name could cause a “likelihood of confu-
sion between his web site and PETA;” rather, he asked that the 
Fourth Circuit “consider his website in conjunction with the 
domain name because, together, they purportedly parody PETA 
and, thus, do not cause a likelihood of confusion.”121 The Fourth 
Circuit articulated its four-part test for a successful parody: (1) 
the site must convey two simultaneous and contradictory mes-
sages; (2) that it is the original; (3) that it is not the original but 
is a parody instead; and (4) it diminishes the risk of consumer 
confusion “by conveying  just enough of the original design to 
allow the consumer to appreciate the point of parody.”122 
The Fourth Circuit found that Doughney’s domain name 
conveyed the first message but that “the second message [was] 
conveyed only when the viewer read[] the content of the web-
site.”123 The Fourth Circuit also noted the district court’s find-
ing that “an internet user would not realize that they were not 
on an official PETA web site until after they had used PETA’s 
                                                          
 119. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d . at 364 (quoting 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 
2d 915, 921 (E.D. Va. 2000)). 
 120. Id. at 362, 369. 
 121. Id. at 366. The Fourth Circuit’s analysis of PETA’s trademark in-
fringement claim centered on whether the “unauthorized use of a trademark 
infringes the trademark holder’s rights if it is likely to confuse an ‘ordinary 
consumer’ as to the source or sponsorship of the goods.” Id. (citing Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. L. & L. Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1992)). 
 122. Id. (quoting Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 
1486 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
 123. Id. While Doughney argued that his website content delivered the 
second required message needed to successfully argue a parody, the Fourth 
Circuit disagreed, implying that it is the domain name (and not the website 
content) which must convey the first and second simultaneous, yet contradic-
tory, messages.  Id. at 366–67. 
LAMPKE LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  11:33 AM 
2010] FAIR USE DEFENSE 289 
mark to access the web page ‘www.peta.org.’”124 Therefore, 
Doughney’s use of www.peta.org was not a constitutionally-
protected parody, and his domain name caused a likelihood of 
confusion.125 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary 
judgment in PETA’s favor on its ACPA claim.126 
Four years later, the Fourth Circuit decided Lamparello v. 
Falwell. In Lamparello v. Falwell, alleged cybersquatter Chris-
topher Lamparello (Lamparello) registered the 
www.fallwell.com domain name,127 an intentional misspelling 
of the name of Reverend Jerry Falwell (Falwell), a nationally 
recognized minister who maintained a website at 
www.falwell.com.128 Lamparello’s www.fallwell.com website 
contained his responses to Falwell’s views about gay people and 
homosexuality that offended Lamparello.129 Although Lampa-
rello’s website stated that “[t]his website is NOT affiliated with 
Jerry Falwell or his ministry,” it did contain a link to Reverend 
Falwell’s www.falwell.com website.130 
Lamparello subsequently filed suit against Falwell, seek-
ing a declaratory judgment of noninfringement.131 Defendant 
Falwell counterclaimed against Lamparello, asserting various 
                                                          
 124. Id. (quoting Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 921). 
 125. The Fourth Circuit also found that Doughney’s domain name itself did 
not indicate it was a parody but rather, copied PETA’s protected mark. Id. at 
366 (quoting Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 
886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original)). 
 126. Id. at 367; see also Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 
1125, 1134–35 (D. Colo. 2000) (contending that defendant’s use of plaintiffs’ 
mark in domain name “does not convey two simultaneous and contradictory 
messages” because “[o]nly by reading through the content of the sites could the 
user discover that the domain names are an attempt at parody”); Planned Pa-
renthood Federation of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 97 Civ. 0629, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3338, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997) aff’d, No. 97-7492, 1998 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22179 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1998) (rejecting the parody defense because 
“[s]eeing or typing the ‘planned parenthood’ mark and accessing the web site 
are two separate and nonsimultaneous activities”). In analyzing PETA’s ACPA 
claim, the Fourth Circuit observed that it was “undisputed that Doughney 
made statements to the press and on his website recommending that PETA 
attempt to ‘make him an offer’ to settle the claim.” People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 368. 
 127. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 311 (4th Cir. 2005). Reverend 
Falwell held the common law trademarks of “Jerry Falwell” and “Falwell” and 
the registered trademark of “Listen America with Jerry Falwell.” Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 312 
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causes of action, including cybersquatting.132 The district court 
considered cross-motions for summary judgment and granted 
summary judgment in Falwell’s favor.133 Lamparello was also 
required to “transfer the domain name [www.fallwell.com] to 
Reverend Falwell.”134 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted that in order for Fal-
well to prevail on his ACPA claim, he had to demonstrate that 
Lamparello: (1) had a bad faith intent to profit from using 
www.fallwell.com; and (2) that www.fallwell.com “is identical 
or confusingly similar to, or dilutive of, the distinctive and fam-
ous [Falwell] mark.”135 In its analysis of whether Lamparello 
acted in bad faith, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Lamparel-
lo’s use of www.fallwell.com was permissible and fair because 
he had only used it to comment on and “criticize Reverend Fal-
well’s views.”136 The court commented that “[t]he use of a do-
main name to engage in criticism or commentary ‘even where 
done for profit’ does not alone evidence a bad faith intent to 
profit.”137 After all, the “ACPA was enacted to eradicate . . . the 
practice of cybersquatters registering several hundred domain 
names in an effort to sell them to the legitimate owners of the 
mark,” not to “impinge the First Amendment rights of critics 
                                                          
 132. Id. 
 133. Lamparello v. Falwell, 360 F. Supp. 2d 768, 775 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
 134. Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 312. However, the district court “denied Re-
verend Falwell’s request for statutory damages or attorney fees, reasoning 
that the ‘primary motive’ of Lamparello’s website was ‘to put forth opinions on 
issues that were contrary to those of [Reverend Falwell]’ and ‘not to take away 
monies or to profit.’” Id. (quoting Falwell, 360 F. Supp. 2d 768 at 775). 
 135. Id. at 318 (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. 
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 367 (4th Cir. 2001)). The parties agreed that Lampa-
rello’s website did not have a “measurable impact on the quantity of visits to 
[Reverend Falwell’s] web site at www.falwell.com.” Id. at 311. 
 136. Id. at 320–321 (citing People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 
F.3d at 367). The court analyzed Lamparello’s criticism of Reverend Falwell in 
his www.fallwell.com website under the “bona fide noncommercial or fair use” 
exception of the ACPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV). Id. at 320 (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 106-412, at 11(1999)). 
 137. The court emphasized that “Lamparello did not . . . stand to gain fi-
nancially from sales of [a book Lamparello favored and whose link he posted 
on his website].” Id. at 320. Applying the remaining eight factors of 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d)(1)(B), the court also determined that Lamparello’s domain name was 
not likely to create a likelihood of confusion as to its source or affiliation, that 
Lamparello had not made an effort to sell the domain name to Reverend Fal-
well for financial gain, and that he had not registered multiple domain names. 
Id. at 321. 
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and commentators.”138 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit reversed 
the district court’s award of summary judgment in favor of Re-
verend Falwell and entered summary judgment in favor of 
Lamparello in the declaratory action.139 In doing so, the Fourth 
Circuit joined the Fifth140 and Sixth Circuits141 in holding that 
“the use of a mark in a domain name for a gripe site criticizing 
the markholder does not constitute cybersquatting.”142 
D.  FIFTH CIRCUIT 
In E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., Plaintiffs, the 
Ernest and Julio Gallo Winery (“Gallo”) had held a registered 
trademark in “Ernest and Julio Gallo” since 1964.143 Gallo sued 
Defendants Spider Webs Ltd. and its three principals (collec-
tively “Defendants”) for violating the ACPA after Defendants 
registered the domain name, www.ernestandjuliogallo.com.144 
Defendants’ business ventures included developing thousands 
of internet addresses by registering them with Network Solu-
tions, Inc. and then selling some of those domain names on 
eBay for $10,000 or more.145 After the lawsuit was initiated, 
Defendants’ website at www.ernestandjuliogallo.com began to 
contain statements about the lawsuit, about alcohol use, corpo-
rate misrepresentations, and references to a “Whiney Wine-
                                                          
 138. Id. at 313. The Fourth Circuit also noted that “[t]he legislature be-
lieved [the fair use provision of the ACPA was necessary] to ‘protect[] the 
rights of Internet users and the interests of all Americans in free speech and 
protected uses of trademarked names for such things as parody, comment, 
criticism, comparative advertising, news reporting, etc.’” Id. at 314 (quoting S. 
REP. NO. 106–140, at 8 (1999)). 
 139. Id. at 322. 
 140. See infra pp. 27–29; see also TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 439 
(5th Cir. 2004) (noting that Maxwell’s domain name at www.trendmaker.com 
was noncommercial because it was designed only “to inform potential custom-
ers about a negative experience with the company,” and thus, it did not violate 
the ACPA). 
 141. See infra pp. 30–32; see also Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. 
Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 809 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that Grosse’s domain name 
of www.lucasnursery.com which informed “fellow consumers of one’s expe-
rience with a particular service provider” did not violate the ACPA). 
 142. Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 321–22 (analyzing Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 and 
Lucas Nursery, 359 F.3d 806). 
 143. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 
2002). 
 144. Id. at 271. Gallo also accused Defendants of trademark infringement, 
unfair competition, and dilution. Id. at 272. 
 145. Id. at 272. 
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ry.”146 The first page of the www.ernestandjuliogallo.com web-
site contained a disclaimer, stating that it was not part of the 
Ernest and Julio Gallo Wineries.147 
While Gallo did not challenge Defendant’s criticisms, it did 
challenge Defendants’ actions which they argued “sought to as-
sociate the Gallo trademark with the contents of its web site 
and because [Defendants] prevented Gallo from using its mark 
to identify its goods and services on the internet.”148 The dis-
trict court concluded that Defendants registered their domain 
name in bad faith and that their use was not a fair use.149 The 
district court then granted summary judgment to Gallo on the 
ACPA claim and ordered the www.ernestandjuliogallo.com do-
main name transferred to Gallo.150 
In an appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Defendants challenged 
the district court’s finding that they had acted with a bad faith 
intent to profit.151 In its bad faith analysis, the Fifth Circuit 
found that Defendants’ use of www.ernestandjuliogallo.com 
was commercial and not a fair use as Defendants had testified 
at a deposition that they hoped Gallo “would contact them re-
garding the domain name.”152 The Fifth Circuit noted that De-
fendants’ website had changed after the lawsuit was filed.  Fol-
lowing the previous decision of the Third Circuit,153 the Fifth 
Circuit held that “when a registrant first uses a web site after 
litigation begins, this undermines any claim that the [Defen-
dants’] use was in good faith or was a fair use under the 
ACPA.”154 The Fifth Circuit subsequently concluded that “[De-
fendants] knew Gallo had a famous mark in which Gallo had 
built up goodwill, and that they hoped to profit from this by re-
gistering ‘ernestandjuliogallo.com’ and waiting for Gallo to con-
                                                          
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 272–73. 
 148. Id. at 279. 
 149. Id. at 272. 
 150. Id. at 278. 
 151. Id. at 274. Defendants did not appeal the district court’s findings that 
“Gallo had a valid registration in its mark, that the mark is famous and dis-
tinctive, and that the domain name registered by Spider Webs is identical or 
confusingly similar to Gallo’s mark.” Id. 
 152. Id. at 275. 
 153. Id. at 276; see Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 485–86 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
 154. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 286 F.3d at 276. 
LAMPKE LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  11:33 AM 
2010] FAIR USE DEFENSE 293 
tact them . . . .”155 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit upheld the dis-
trict court’s determination that Defendants had acted with a 
bad faith intent to profit and affirmed summary judgment in 
favor of Gallo.156 
Two years later, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in 
TMI Inc. v. Maxwell. Plaintiff TMI, Inc. (TMI), a company that 
constructed homes under the name TrendMaker Homes, sued 
Defendant Joseph Maxwell (“Maxwell”) for violating the 
ACPA.157 Maxwell was unsatisfied with a TMI representative 
about a model house and he created a website at 
www.trendmakerhome.com, which closely resembled TMI’s 
www.trendmakerhomes.com website.158 Maxwell’s website con-
tained his complaints and displeasures about his interactions 
with TMI but informed viewers the website was not a TMI-
sponsored site.159 Maxwell’s website also included a “Treasure 
Chest” feature which allowed viewers to get information about 
another contractor who had performed construction work for 
Maxwell.160 Maxwell eventually removed the site and let the 
www.trendmakerhome.com registration expire.161 TMI subse-
quently acquired the www.trendmakerhome.com domain 
name.162 After Maxwell failed to re-acquire the 
www.trendmakerhome.com domain name, he registered the 
www.trendmakerhome.info domain name but never posted any 
content on a website at that domain.163 
After trial the district court held that the ACPA requires a 
mark to have a commercial use for an alleged cybersquatter to 
be liable under the ACPA.164 Finding that Maxwell’s use of 
www.trendmakerhome.com was the “kind of commercial use 
                                                          
 155. Id. at 277. The district court determined that “because internet do-
main names cannot contain ampersands or spaces, and because all internet 
domain names must end in a top-level domain such as ‘.co,’ ‘.org.,’ ‘.net,’ etc., 
‘ernestandjuliogallo.com’ is effectively the same thing as ‘Ernest & Julio Gal-
lo.’” Id. at 276. 
 156. Id. at 277. 
 157. TMI Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004). TMI further alleged 
that Maxwell’s website violated the anti-dilution provision of the Lanham Act. 
Id. at 434 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) and the Texas Anti-Dilution Statute, 
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 16.29)). 
 158. Id. at 434. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 434–35. 
 161. Id. at 434. 
 162. Id. at 435. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 436. 
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prohibited by the ACPA,” it determined that Maxwell had vi-
olated the ACPA and enjoined him “from using names, marks, 
and domain names similar to . . . TMI’s marks, including Trend 
Maker.”165 The court ordered Maxwell to transfer 
www.trendmakerhome.info to TMI.166 
Maxwell appealed, and the Fifth Circuit determined that 
the ACPA “does not contain . . . a specific commercial-use re-
quirement”167 but rather, has nine factors to determine wheth-
er a “bad faith intent to profit” existed.168 The Fifth Circuit ul-
timately held that Maxwell’s use of TMI’s mark was 
noncommercial because: (1) Maxwell never accepted payment 
for any postings on the Treasure Chest feature; (2) Maxwell did 
not charge for viewing the Treasure Chest feature; (3) Maxwell 
never intended to charge money for viewers using his website; 
(4) Maxwell’s website did not contain any advertising or links 
to other websites; (5) Maxwell was not engaged in the business 
of selling domain names; and (6) there was no evidence that 
Maxwell’s use had any business purpose.169 
In analyzing whether Maxwell had a bad faith intent to 
profit, the Fifth Circuit stated that “[m]uch of the district 
court’s analysis of bad faith intent to profit focuse[d] on Max-
well’s behavior during the settlement negotiations and . . . his 
                                                          
 165. Id. at 435, 438. 
 166. The district court also found that Maxwell had violated the anti-
dilution provision of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)) and the Texas Anti-
Dilution Statute (TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 16.29). Id. at 435. While the 
district court issued an order requiring TMI to submit a proposed judgment 
entry and supposedly giving Maxwell ten days to respond to TMI’s proposed 
judgment entry, it eventually signed TMI’s proposed judgment entry without 
allowing Maxwell ten days to respond. Id. at 434–35. Furthermore, the signed 
judgment entry provided a much broader injunction than the district court’s 
order. Id. at 435. While the Fifth Circuit analyzed the depth of this broader 
injunction, such analysis is not pertinent to this Article. 
 167. Id. at 436. 
 168. Id. (citing 15 USC § 1125(d)(IV)). 
 169. Id. at 437–38; cf. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 
270, 275–76 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding that where Defendant registered do-
main names like www.www.ernestandjuliogallo.com and subsequently tried to 
auction off the names while refusing bids under $10,000, Defendant’s use was 
clearly commercial and thus, the court “did not need to decide whether the 
ACPA also requires use in commerce”); Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. 
Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 809 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that it need not consider 
arguments about whether the ACPA covers noncommercial use, “as the sta-
tute directs a reviewing court to consider only a defendant’s ‘bad faith intent 
to profit’ from the use of a mark held by another party”). 
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backing out of [a] settlement.”170 The Fifth Circuit also noted 
that “the Sixth Circuit recently affirmed a trial court’s finding 
that a disgruntled customer who posted a website similar to 
Maxwell’s did not have a bad faith intent to profit,”171 and ex-
plained that: 
Maxwell made bona fide noncommercial use of the mark in his site, 
and . . . TMI made no showing that Maxwell intended to divert cus-
tomers from its own site. . . . Maxwell never offered to sell the domain 
name, and certainly never had a pattern of selling domain names to 
mark owners. Maxwell did not behave improperly when providing 
contact information [when registering his domain name]. . . . Maxwell 
registered the second domain name [of www.trendmakerhome.info] 
for the same purposes as the first one and only after his registration 
of the first name [www.trendmakerhome.com] expired.172 
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit followed the Sixth Circuit’s ra-
tionale in Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, and 
held that “Maxwell’s conduct is not the kind of harm that [the] 
ACPA was designed to prevent.”173 Thus, it reversed the judg-
ment of the district court and entered judgment in favor of 
Maxwell.174 
E.  SIXTH CIRCUIT 
In Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse,175 Plain-
                                                          
 170. TMI, 368 F.3d at 439. The Fifth Circuit criticized the district court for 
not explaining in its Memorandum and Order how the nine bad faith factors 
applied to the facts of the case. Id. 
 171. Id. at 439 (citing Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 
F.3d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 2004)); see infra pp. 30–32. The court also emphasized 
that “. . . as in Lucas Nursery, the site’s purpose as a method to inform poten-
tial customers about a negative experience with the company is key.” Id. 
 172. Id. at 440 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(IV)–(VIII)). 
 173. Id. The court also concluded that the district court erred when it found 
that Maxwell’s actions violated the Texas Anti-Dilution Statute (TEX. BUS. & 
COM. CODE § 16.29) because the statute was “not intended to address non-
trademark uses of a name to comment on, criticize, ridicule, parody, or dispa-
rage the goods or business of the name’s owner.” Id. (quoting Express One 
Int’l, Inc. v. Steinbeck, 53 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Tex. App. 2001)). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 
2004). Prior to Lucas Nursery, the Sixth Circuit had rendered an ACPA deci-
sion in 2002 in Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2002). However, this 
case was essentially decided on procedural grounds and is not substantially 
related to the arguments made in this Article. In Bird, Plaintiff Darrell Bird 
(Bird) sued several alleged cybersquatters for cybersquatting, trademark in-
fringement, unfair competition, and trademark dilution. Bird owned a busi-
ness named Financia, Inc. as well as the www.financia.com domain name. De-
fendants had registered the tradename “Financia” with the United States 
Patent & Trademark Office and also registered www.efinancia.com as a do-
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tiff Lucas Nursery and Landscaping, Inc. (Lucas Nursery) sued 
a former customer, Defendant Michelle Grosse (Grosse), who 
was displeased with Lucas Nursery’s landscaping services, for 
violating the ACPA.176 Grosse had registered the domain name, 
www.lucasnursery.com, and created a website titled “My Lucas 
Landscaping Experience” at that domain to complain about the 
Lucas Nursery services she received.177 Both parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment, and the district court subse-
quently granted summary judgment in Grosse’s favor.178 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit conducted a de novo review of 
whether Grosse had acted with a “bad faith intent to profit” as 
required by the ACPA.179 It found that the following “bad faith” 
factors weighed against Grosse: (1) she did “not hold a trade-
mark or other intellectual property rights to the domain name 
or names included in the registered domain name;” (2) “[t]he 
domain name neither consists of her legal name or any name 
used to refer to her[;]” and (3) “Grosse has also not used the 
domain name in connection with any offering of goods or ser-
vices.”180 As to the bad faith fourth factor regarding “fair use,” 
the Court found that Grosse’s website was “used for noncom-
mercial purposes.”181 
                                                          
main name. Defendants parked the www.efinancia.com domain name on the 
website of an Internet domain names registrar. Id. at 869–70. The 
www.efinancia.com domain name was later listed on an auction website as be-
ing available for purchase and Defendants also attempted separately to sell 
the domain name. Bird argued that Defendants had a bad faith intent to profit 
by registering the www.efinancia.com domain name. Defendants successfully 
filed dispositive motions pursuant to Fed. Civ. R. 12(B)(2) and (6). Id. at 870, 
876. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that only one defendant had registered 
the www.efinancia.com domain name and held that “liability for using a do-
main name can only exist for the registrant or that person’s authorized licen-
see.” Id. at 881. The Sixth Circuit also found that 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) 
precluded liability under the ACPA and affirmed the district court’s judgment 
in Defendants’ favor. Id. at 877–79, 881–82. 
 176. Lucas Nursery, 359 F.3d at 807. 
 177. Id. at 807–08. After learning of Grosse’s website, Lucas Nursery even-
tually sent Grosse a cease and desist letter, prompting Grosse to contact the 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office and discover that Lucas Nursery was not a 
registered trademark. Id. at 808. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. With respect to the nine bad faith factors, the court stated that “it 
is not clear to this Court that the presence of simply one factor that indicates a 
bad faith intent to profit, without more, can satisfy an imposition of liability 
within the meaning of the ACPA.” Id. at 810. 
 180. Id. at 809. 
 181. Id. 
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The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth “bad faith” factors also 
weighed in Grosse’s favor.182 Since Lucas Nursery did not have 
a website, Grosse could not have intended to divert consumers 
from Lucas Nursery’s website or mislead users as to the web-
site’s sponsor.183 To the contrary, Grosse’s website stated that 
Grosse had created it for the sole purpose of describing her 
prior dealings with Lucas Nursery.184 Grosse also never bought 
or registered additional domain names, never tried to sell the 
domain name to Lucas Nursery, nor did she provide false con-
tact information when she registered the domain name.185 The 
Sixth Circuit further found that it was never Grosse’s intention 
to register hundreds of domain names in the hopes of selling 
them to trademark owners.186 Rather, it found that “Grosse’s 
actions . . . seem to have been undertaken in the spirit of in-
forming fellow consumers about the practices of a landscaping 
company that she believed had performed inferior work on her 
yard[,]” a purpose consistent with the ACPA’s consumer protec-
tion aim.187 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Grosse.188 
Seven months later, the Sixth Circuit decided Daimler-
Chrysler v. The Net, Inc., Plaintiff DaimlerChrysler sued De-
fendant The Net Inc. (“the Net”) for ACPA violations after the 
Net registered the www.foradodge.com domain name, and 
created a pornographic website at that domain.189  Decades ear-
lier, DaimlerChrysler had registered the DODGE mark as a 
trademark, and it later established a www.4ADODGE.com 
                                                          
 182. Id. at 809–10. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 811. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 809–11. Lucas Nursery argued that the decision in People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney supported a finding that Grosse 
had violated the ACPA. Id. at 810 (citing People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001)). The Sixth Circuit disa-
greed, noting that in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, the alleged 
cybersquatter had registered the www.peta.org domain name and created a 
website at that domain name in which he urged PETA to make him an offer 
for the www.peta.org domain name. The alleged cybersquatter in PETA had 
also “registered other domain names that [were] identical or similar to the 
marks or names of other famous people and organizations.” Id. The Sixth Cir-
cuit found that Grosse had not “engaged in . . . such offensive conduct.” Id. 
 189. DaimlerChrysler v. The Net, Inc., 388 F.3d 201, 203 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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website to advertise and market its products.190 The district 
court entered summary judgment for DaimlerChrysler and 
permanently enjoined the defendants from using the “fora-
dodge” name.191 
On appeal, the Net argued that the district court erred be-
cause: (1) the mark “4ADODGE” was not a protected trade-
mark for purposes of the ACPA; (2) it did not have a bad faith 
intent to profit when the www.foradodge.com domain name was 
registered; and (3) its actions were protected by the ACPA’s 
safe harbor exception.192 In its analysis of whether “4ADODGE” 
was a protected mark, the Sixth Circuit noted that a trademark 
need not be formally registered in order to be protected under 
the ACPA.193 Although the “4ADODGE” mark was not regis-
tered, DaimlerChrysler had registered its DODGE mark in 
1939 and continuously used it thereafter.194 However, the mark 
“ha[d] been used by the plaintiff to distinguish its automobiles 
for a number of years [and as] early as 1994, [p]laintiff adver-
tised and used as a toll free telephone number 1-800-4-A-
DODGE.”195 DaimlerChrysler had also used its 
www.4ADODGE.COM website since 1995.196 
The Sixth Circuit also noted that “[e]ven if there was a ge-
nuine issue of material fact as to whether [DaimlerChrysler] 
has a valid trademark in 4ADODGE, the district court also 
concluded that the [Net’s] ‘foradodge.com’ domain name was 
confusingly similar to [DaimlerChrysler’s] distinctive and fam-
ous DODGE mark.”197 The court observed that “[c]ourts gener-
ally have held that a domain name that incorporates a trade-
mark is ‘confusingly similar to’ that mark if ‘consumers might 
think that [the domain name] is used, approved, or permitted’ 
by the mark holder.”198 Moreover, it noted that “slight differ-
                                                          
 190. Id. at 203, 205. 
 191. Id. at 203. 
 192. Id. at 203–04. Since the first time the Net asserted that they “had rea-
sonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or 
otherwise lawful” was during the appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered this ar-
gument waived. Id. at 204–05, n.1 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii)). 
 193. Id. at 205; see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 
209 (2000); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). 
 194. DaimlerChrysler, 388 F.3d at 205. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Ford Motor Co., v. Greatdo-
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ences between domain names and registered marks, such as 
the addition of minor or generic words to the disputed domain 
names are irrelevant.”199 
As to whether the Net had a bad faith intent to profit when 
it registered the www.foradodge.com domain name, the Sixth 
Circuit determined that eight of the nine factors, 200 weighed in 
favor of a finding of bad faith.201 After all, the Net had regis-
tered dozens of other domain names that were similar to other 
trademarks, such as www.themicrosoftnetwork.com.202 There-
fore, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary 
judgment in DaimlerChrysler’s favor.203 
The Audi AG v. D’Amato, case soon followed. Plaintiff, Au-
di AG (Audi), sued Defendant, Bob D’Amato (D’Amato), for 
ACPA violations, trademark infringement, and dilution after 
D’Amato registered the www.audisport.com domain name to 
sell Audi goods and merchandise containing Audi’s “AUDI” and 
“AUDI FOUR RING LOGO” trademarks.204 D’Amato described 
and displayed Audi’s trademarks on his website after allegedly 
receiving verbal permission from an Audi employee.205 The 
www.audisport.com website’s homepage also contained state-
ments indicating that the website was Audi’s “cooperative” and 
its content contained hyperlinks to www.audisportline.com.206 
                                                          
mains.Com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 641 (E.D. Mich. 2001)). The Sixth Cir-
cuit also noted that the Net did not appeal the district court’s finding that the 
“‘foradodge.com’ domain name is confusingly similar to [DaimlerChrysler’s] 
protected DODGE mark.” Id. at 206. 
 199. Id. (citing Ford Motor Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d at 641) (internal quotations 
omitted) (holding that marks incorporated into the domain names 
“4fordparts.com,” “jaguarcenter.com,” and “volvoguy.com” were confusingly 
similar to the marks FORD, JAGUAR, and VOLVO); see also Spear, Leeds, & 
Kellogg v. Rosado, 122 F. Supp. 2d 403, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that do-
main names that combined the “Redi” mark with generic or descriptive terms 
were confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s trademark). 
 200. The sixth bad faith factor under the ACPA, which the court found did 
not weigh in favor of a finding of bad faith, contemplates whether a person’s 
offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the mark owner 
or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an intent 
to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or 
the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct. 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI) (2006). 
 201. DaimlerChrysler, 388 F.3d at 205. 
 202. Id. at 204, 206 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)). 
 203. Id. at 207. 
 204. Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 538 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 205. Id. at 539. 
 206. Id. at 540. 
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Consumers who used the link to access www.audisportline.com 
were eventually directed to an “Audisport Boutique and Servic-
es” website that sold hats and shirts containing the “Audi 
Sport” logo and offered www.audisport.com email services.207 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Audi 
on all of its claims and awarded it a permanent injunction.208 
On appeal the Sixth Circuit analyzed whether D’Amato 
acted with a bad faith intent to profit.209 The Court found that 
the fourth bad faith factor, regarding the bona fide noncommer-
cial or fair use of a mark, weighed against D’Amato “because 
D’Amato used www.audisport.com to sell merchandise and 
email addresses bearing the Audi name, and up until the dis-
trict court issued the injunction, was selling advertising space 
bearing the Audi name.”210 The Court also determined that 
D’Amato could not invoke the ACPA’s safe harbor exception211 
because: 
[A] court should . . . make use of this “reasonable belief” defense very 
sparingly and only in the most unusual cases. That is, the court 
should place emphasis on the phrase “had reasonable grounds to be-
lieve” that the conduct was lawful, focusing primarily upon the objec-
tive reasonableness and credibility of the defendant’s professed ignor-
ance of the fact that its conduct was unlawful. Otherwise, every 
cybersquatter would solemnly aver that it was entitled to this defense 
because it believed that its conduct was lawful.212 
Therefore, the Sixth District affirmed the district court’s 
summary judgment for Audi.213 
                                                          
 207. Id. at 539–40. D’Amato stood to benefit financially from the hyper-
links on his website because he would receive a portion of the sales revenue, 
but his website never made any profits. Id. at 540. 
 208. At the time Audi’s motion for summary judgment was granted, 
D’Amato’s website contained a disclaimer noting that “this page is not asso-
ciated with Audi AG or Audi USA in any way.” Id. at 539, 541 (quoting Audi 
AG v. D’Amato, 381 F. Supp. 2d 644, 650 (E.D. Mich. 2005)). 
 209. Id. at 548; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
 210. Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 549. 
 211. Id. at 548–49; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 212. Id. at 549 (emphasis in original) (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 25.78 (4th ed. 2004)); see also Harrods Ltd. v. 
Sixty Internet Domain Names, 157 F. Supp. 2d 658, 679 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[A]ll but 
the most blatant cybersquatters will be able to put forth at least some lawful 
motives for their behavior. To hold that all such individuals may qualify for 
the safe harbor would frustrate Congress’ purpose by artificially limiting the 
statute’s reach.”). 
 213. Audi AG, 469 F.3d at 539. 
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F.  EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
In Coca-Cola v. Purdy, Plaintiffs Coca-Cola Company, 
McDonald’s Corp., Pepsico., Inc., The Washington Post Compa-
ny, and Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Company, LLC 
(collectively Plaintiffs) sued Defendant, William Purdy (Purdy), 
for ACPA violations after Purdy registered domain names such 
as www.drinkcoke.org, www.mycoca-cola.com, and www.my-
washingtontonpost.com, and created websites at those 
names.214 Purdy linked these websites to antiabortion websites 
containing images of aborted fetuses, suggesting that Plaintiffs 
supported abortions.215 The district court entered several pre-
liminary injunctions against Purdy prohibiting him from using 
the domain names.216 Purdy then proceeded to register more 
than sixty new domain names containing Plaintiffs’ marks, 
such as www.gopepsi.org.217 
On appeal Purdy argued: (1) that the district court erred in 
granting a preliminary injunction against him because Plain-
tiffs had not demonstrated a strong possibility that they would 
succeed on the merits of their claims;218 and (2) the First 
Amendment allowed “him to use the domain names at issue to 
attract Internet users to websites containing political expres-
sion and criticism of the plaintiffs.”219 
The Eighth Circuit noted that the key issue was whether 
Purdy’s domain names were “identical or confusingly similar to 
[Plaintiffs’] marks,” not whether they were “likely to be con-
fused with [Plaintiffs’] domain names.”220 It did not matter that 
“confusion about a website’s source or sponsorship could be re-
                                                          
 214. Coca-Cola Co., v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 779 (8th Cir. 2004). Purdy’s 
www.my-washingtonpost.com website was virtually identical to the website 
maintained by Plaintiff, The Washington Post, located at 
www.mywashingtonpost.com. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 780–82. 
 217. Id. at 777–82. 
 218. Id. at 782. A court considers the following four factors when deciding 
whether to grant a preliminary injunction: 1) the probability of the movant’s 
success on the merits; 2) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; 3) the 
balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will 
inflict on other interested parties; and 4) whether the issuance of the prelimi-
nary injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 782; see also Dataphase Sys., 
Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 
 219. Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 787. 
 220. Id. at 783; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). 
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solved by visiting the website . . . .”221 The court concluded that 
Purdy’s domain names were confusingly similar to Plaintiffs’ 
marks, given Purdy’s intent to profit from such similarities 
through the use of unsuspecting Internet users.222 
Purdy also asserted that he only used the domain names to 
communicate his personal message.223 However, the pertinent 
issue was “whether the First Amendment protects a misleading 
use of plaintiffs’ marks in domain names to attract an unwit-
ting and possibly unwilling audience to Purdy’s message.”224 
In analyzing whether Purdy had a bad faith intent to prof-
it, the court noted that while Purdy had “made some noncom-
mercial or fair use of the plaintiffs’ marks in critical commen-
tary sites accessible under the domain names, prior to the filing 
of this lawsuit he principally attached the names to antiabor-
tion websites that made no mention of plaintiffs whatsoever.”225 
The Court also determined that Purdy’s website could not be 
completely noncommercial because it “directly solicited mone-
tary contributions and offered various antiabortion merchan-
dise for sale.”226 The Court was not persuaded by Purdy’s ar-
                                                          
 221. Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 783. The Eighth Circuit relied on People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001) 
wherein “the Fourth Circuit found peta.org confusingly similar to PETA’s 
mark even though the attached website was a clear parody of the organization, 
for ‘an internet user would not realize that they were not on an official PETA 
web site until after they had used PETA’s mark to access the web page 
‘www.peta.org.’” Id. at 783 (citing People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 
263 F.3d at 366–67); see also Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 
238 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2001) ( holding that the domain name “vw.net” was 
similar to Volkswagen’s “VW” mark even though attached website advertised 
an ISP); Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497–98 
(2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the domain name “sporty’s.com” was confusingly 
similar to aviation catalog company’s “Sporty’s” mark even though the website 
advertised a Christmas tree farm). 
 222. Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 784. 
 223. Id. at 787. 
 224. Id. The court also emphasized that the issue on appeal was not 
whether Purdy had a First Amendment right “to use the Internet to protest 
abortion and criticize the plaintiffs or to use expressive domain names that are 
unlikely to cause confusion.” Id. (citing Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 
770, 778 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the domain name “taubmansucks.com” 
was permissible because it removed any confusion as to its source)); see also 
Name.Space. Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 585–86 (2d Cir. 
2000) (holding that domain names which themselves express a message may 
be protected). 
 225. Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 785–86. 
 226. Id. at 786 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV)). 
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gument that his use of Plaintiffs’ marks in his domain names 
were a “fair use” and that he reasonably believed his conduct 
was protected by the ACPA, given: (1) his pattern of continuing 
to create domain names after a preliminary injunction had 
been issued; and (2) his conduct in another case where he was 
enjoined after creating a website to criticize his former boss.227 
Because the “First Amendment does not protect the deceptive 
use of domain names that are identical or confusingly similar to 
another’s trademarks,” the Court found that Purdy’s conduct 
was likely to have violated the ACPA.228 
The Eighth District further found that Purdy “registered 
many of these domain names . . .  to divert Internet users to 
websites that could tarnish and disparage their marks by creat-
ing initial confusion as to the sponsorship of the attached web-
sites and implying that their owners have taken positions on a 
hotly contested issue.”229 The Court commented that the First 
Amendment will not shield “the use of a trademark in a domain 
name that creates a likelihood of confusion as to the source or 
sponsorship of the attached website.”230 While acknowledging 
that Purdy had a “right to express his message over the Inter-
net,” the court found that he had “not shown that the First 
                                                          
 227. Id. at 788 (citing People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. 
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 369 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that a defendant “who 
acts even partially in bad faith in registering a domain name is not, as a mat-
ter of law, entitled to benefit from [the ACPA’s] safe harbor provision”)); see 
also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 228. Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 790. The Eighth District also held that 
“[u]se of a trademark in a way that is likely to cause confusion as to the source 
or sponsorship or the expression is not protected conduct.” Id. at 791; see S.F. 
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 527–28 (1987) 
(holding that the United States Olympic Committee’s property right in the 
word “Olympic” can be protected without violating the First Amendment); An-
heuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that First Amendment right does not apply to the use of beer manufactur-
er’s marks in parody that was likely to cause confusion). The court also noted 
that Purdy was free to register domain names like 
www.PurdySupportsPepsi.com to spread his antiabortion message because 
such a name would not be “identical or confusingly similar to any of plaintiffs’ 
marks.” Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 790–91. 
 229. Id. at 786 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V)). 
 230. Id. at 787 (citing Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 
97 Civ. 0629, 1997 WL 133313, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997), aff’d No. 
97-7492, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22179 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1998) (holding that the 
First Amendment does not prevent injunctive relief against use of plannedpa-
renthood.com, because use of the term “planned parenthood” was not part of a 
communicative message but was merely used to identify the source of a prod-
uct)). 
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Amendment protects his appropriation of plaintiffs’ marks in 
order to spread his protest message by confusing Internet users 
into thinking that they are entering one of the plaintiffs’ web-
sites.”231 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order 
granting preliminary injunctions against Purdy.232 
G.  NINTH CIRCUIT 
In Interstellar Starship Services, Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., Plaintiff 
Interstellar Starship Services (Interstellar) registered the 
www.epix.com domain name and created a website at that do-
main to showcase its electronic pictures and technical abili-
ties.233 Defendant, Epix Incorporated (Epix, Inc.), a manufac-
turer and seller of imaging hardware, had registered the 
“EPIX” trademark in 1990. 234 Epix, Inc. sued Interstellar for 
cybersquatting, but after a bench trial, the district court con-
cluded that Interstellar had not violated the ACPA.235 On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit held that Interstellar had not acted 
with a bad faith intent to profit when it registered the 
www.epix.com domain name and created a website at that do-
main and affirmed the district court.236 
                                                          
 231. Id. at 788 (citing 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:76 (4th ed. 2000)). The Eighth Cir-
cuit opined “Purdy retains multiple lawful avenues of expression, however, 
including publication of his ideas over the Internet using nonconfusing domain 
names.” Id. at 789. The Eighth Circuit also found that “[t]he right to dissemi-
nate criticism on the Internet cannot trump the public’s right not to be de-
ceived by a confusingly similar domain name.” Id. at 789 (alteration in origi-
nal) (citing 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 25:76 (4th ed. 2000)). 
 232. Id. at 792. The court distinguished the facts before it from the deci-
sions of the Fifth Circuit in Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 
F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2004) and TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 
2004). Neither of the defendants in those  cases registered additional infring-
ing domain names, offered to transfer those domain names for consideration, 
linked the domain names to websites about issues other than the company’s 
business or to websites that solicited donations or sold merchandise, or dem-
onstrated a bad faith intent to profit from their respective plaintiffs’ marks. 
Coca-Cola Co., 382 F.3d at 787. 
 233. Interstellar Starship Services, Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 939–40 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
 234. Id. For purposes of this Article, only the ACPA-related portions of the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Interstellar Starship Services are discussed. See In-
terstellar Starship Serv., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 235. Interstellar Starship Services, 304 F.3d at 938. 
 236. Id. at 947. 
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Three years later, the Ninth Circuit decided Bosley Medical 
Institute v. KremerPlaintiff Bosley Medical Institute (Bosley) 
sued alleged cybersquatter Defendant Michael Kremer (Kre-
mer), a dissatisfied customer, after Kremer registered the 
www.BosleyMedical.com domain name and created a website at 
that domain to criticize Bosley and report on a prosecutorial in-
vestigation of Bosley.237 “Bosley Medical” was Bosley’s regis-
tered trademark.238 Kremer maintained a second website at 
www.BosleyMedicalViolations.com, which viewers could access 
from a link on www.BosleyMedical.com.239 The district court 
entered summary judgment in Kremer’s favor and dismissed 
Bosley’s ACPA claim after determining that Kremer’s use of 
Bosley’s mark was noncommercial.240 
On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision award of summary judgment in Kremer’s favor.241 In 
its analysis of whether the ACPA required a cybersquatter to 
make a commercial use of a trademark owner’s mark, the Court 
concluded that it did not. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit agreed 
with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ determinations that the 
ACPA does not require commercial use of a mark.242  However, 
it acknowledged that “[t]he use of a domain name in connection 
with a site that makes a noncommercial or fair use of the mark 
does not necessarily mean that the domain name registrant 
lacked bad faith.”243 The Court also concluded that Kremer’s 
                                                          
 237. Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2005). 
Bosley also sued Kremer for trademark infringement, dilution, unfair competi-
tion, various state law claims, and libel. Id. at 674. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Bosley did not challenge Kremer’s use of the 
www.BosleyMedicalViolations.com website in the case. Id. 
 240. Id. at 675. 
 241. Id. at 674. 
 242. See DaimlerChrysler v. The Net Inc., 388 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 
2004); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Catalonette, 342 F.3d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 
2003); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 243. Bosley Med. Inst., Inc., 403 F.3d at 680–81 (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. 
Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 778 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106–412, at 11 (1999) (“This factor is 
not intended to create a loophole that otherwise might swallow the bill, how-
ever, by allowing a domain name registrant to evade application of the Act by 
merely putting up a noninfringing site under an infringing domain name.”). 
Given that one of the nine bad faith factors is whether one had a “bona fide 
non-commercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain 
name,” the Ninth Circuit noted that such “factor would be meaningless if the 
statute exempted all non-commercial uses of a trademark within a domain 
name.” Bosley Med. Inst., Inc., 403 F.3d at 681 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 
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website was not a commercial one because although it linked to 
discussion groups and advertisements, it did not offer any 
products or advertisements for purchase.244 Rather, Kremer’s 
website simply expressed his views about Bosley’s services.245 
The Ninth Circuit also reversed the district court’s award 
of summary judgment in Kremer’s favor on two additional 
grounds. First, discovery on Bosley’s ACPA claim had not yet 
been completed at the time summary judgment was granted.246  
Second, the ACPA claim “was not within the scope of the sum-
mary judgment motion . . .” and the district court had failed to 
notify Bosley that it would rule on the ACPA claim when decid-
ing the motion.247 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that “the 
district court [had] erred in granting summary judgment to 
Kremer” on the ACPA claim and remanded the claim to the dis-
trict court for further review.248 
H.  TENTH CIRCUIT 
In 2008 the Tenth Circuit decided Utah Lighthouse Minis-
try v. Foundation for Apologetic Information and Research, and 
articulated a new test for determining when fair use, including 
parodies, can survive an ACPA claim.249 Plaintiff Utah Ligh-
thouse Ministry (UTLM) was an organization founded by Je-
rald and Sandra Tanner whose mission was to criticize the Lat-
                                                          
1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV)). 
 244. Id. at 678 (citing TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 
2004) (holding that the commercial use requirement is not satisfied where de-
fendant’s site had no outside links)). Regarding Bosley’s Lanham Act claim, 
the court held that “the noncommercial use of a trademark as the domain 
name of a website—the subject of which is consumer commentary about the 
products and services represented by the mark—does not constitute infringe-
ment under the Lanham Act.” Id. at 674. The court also noted that there were 
“no links to any of Bosley’s competitors’ websites” on Kremer’s 
www.BosleyMedical.com website. Id. 
 245. Id. at 678–79. The court emphasized that “trademark rights do not 
entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use of the mark by another who is 
communicating ideas or expressing points of view.” Id. at 676 (citing Mattel, 
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quota-
tion marks and citations omitted)). 
 246. Id. at 681 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986)). 
 247. Id. at 674, 680. 
 248. Id. at 672–74, 682. 
 249. Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 
527 F.3d 1045, 1048 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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ter-day Saints (LDS) church.250 UTLM used its www.utlm.org 
website to sell books supporting its mission.251 Defendant 
Foundation for Apologetic Information and Research (FAIR), 
was an organization with a website that responded to criticisms 
of the LDS church.252 Defendant Allen Wyatt (Wyatt), FAIR’s 
vice president and webmaster, registered ten domain names 
(including www.utahlighthouse.com, www.utahlighthouse.org, 
and other various combinations of the words “Utah Lighthouse 
Ministry” and the Tanner’s names).253 
When viewers visited any of Wyatt’s ten domain names, 
they were directed to Wyatt’s own website parodying UTLM’s 
www.utlm.org website.254 At the time Wyatt created his parodic 
website, “UTAH LIGHTHOUSE” was not a registered trade-
mark.255 Although Wyatt’s website was similar in some respect 
to UTLM’s website, it had different yet parallel content.256 For 
example, the two websites had lighthouses with black and 
white stripes and similar welcome messages for viewers.257 
Wyatt’s website also contained the words “Destroy, Mislead, 
and Deceive” but did not have a disclaimer indicating it was not 
associated with UTLM’s website.258 Rather, UTLM’s welcome 
message on its website read “Welcome to the Official Website of 
the Utah Lighthouse Ministry, founded by Jerald and Sandra 
Tanner,” while Wyatt’s welcome message read “Welcome to an 
official website about the Utah Lighthouse Ministry, which was 
founded by Jerald and Sandra Tanner.”259 
UTLM sued Defendants FAIR and Wyatt (collectively, “De-
fendants”) for trademark infringement, unfair competition, 
trademark dilution, cybersquatting, and trade dress infringe-
ment.260 After considering cross motions for summary judg-
ment, the district court entered summary judgment for Defen-
                                                          
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 1048–49. 
 254. Id. at 1049, 1057. 
 255. Id. at 1050. 
 256. Id. at 1048–49. 
 257. Id. at 1049. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. (emphasis added). Wyatt’s website did not offer any goods, servic-
es, or advertising for sale but did include hyperlinks to a Brigham Young Uni-
versity organization, articles criticizing the Tanners, the LDS church website, 
and the FAIR homepage. Id. 
 260. Id. 
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dants on all six claims.261 
UTLM appealed the summary judgment ruling only as to 
its trademark infringement, unfair competition, and cybers-
quatting claims.262 UTLM argued: (1) that Wyatt had used the 
“UTAH LIGHTHOUSE” mark “in connection with any goods or 
services” in part because Wyatt’s website contained hyperlinks 
to the FAIR website which sold goods and therefore, Wyatt’s 
website was commercial in use; and (2) that Wyatt’s website 
was not a parody.263 
The district court had held, and the Tenth District agreed, 
that Wyatt’s website did not constitute a commercial use be-
cause it “provided no goods or services, earned no revenue, and 
[did not have] direct links to any commercial sites.”264 Rather, 
Wyatt’s website was used in connection with his own commen-
tary about UTLM and his “use of the [UTAH LIGHTHOUSE] 
trademark was separated from any goods or services offered for 
sale.”265 UTLM also asserted that Wyatt’s website prevented 
Internet users from reaching the products sold on its own web-
site.266 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding that “the defen-
dant in a trademark infringement and unfair competition case 
must use the mark in connection with the goods or services of a 
competing producer, not merely to make a comment on the 
trademark owner’s goods or services.”267 
Finally, UTLM argued that “the overall commercial nature 
of the Internet renders the [Wyatt] website itself a commercial 
use.”268 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that 
not all Internet uses are commercial for purposes of the Lan-
ham Act.269 Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Defendants’ 
use of UTLM’s trademark, UTAH LIGHTHOUSE, was not “in 
                                                          
 261. Id. at 1048. 
 262. Id. at 1050. 
 263. Id. at 1052, 1056–57. A hyperlink “is an active button or text on web 
pages that, when clicked with a mouse, immediately takes the user to some 
other web page.” See Nupp, supra note 19, at 656. 
 264. Id. at 1052 (citing Mem. Decision & Order at 11); see also Bosley Med. 
Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding a sequence of links 
to advertising did not constitute commercial use). 
 265. Utah Lighthouse, 527 F.3d at 1052–53 (citing Bosley, 403 F.3d at 679). 
 266. Id. at 1053. 
 267. Id. at 1053 (emphasis added). 
 268. Id. at 1051–52; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
 269. 527 F.3d at 1054. 
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connection with any goods or services.”270 
As to the issue of whether Wyatt’s website was a parody 
and would exempt Defendants from liability under the ACPA,  
the Tenth Circuit found that the district court had not erred in 
determining that Wyatt’s website was a parody because it did 
not cause a likelihood of confusion.271 The Tenth Circuit stated: 
A critical parody nevertheless “derive[s] benefit from the reputation of 
the owner of the mark . . . [in that] no parody could be made without 
the initial mark.” What is critical is that the benefit “arises from the 
humorous association, not from public confusion as to the source of 
the marks,” so no inference of confusion can be drawn from the inten-
tional use simply as a parody.272 
Noting that a parody can succeed only if the trademark at 
issue is strong, the Court concluded that Wyatt’s website was a 
parody and the likelihood of confusion was minimal.273 It em-
phasized that “it would be immediately apparent to anyone vi-
siting the Wyatt website that it was not the UTLM website due 
to the differences in content . . . as there are sufficient differ-
ences between the content and style of the two websites to 
avoid the possibility of confusion.”274 Thus, the district court 
had properly granted summary judgment in Defendants’ favor 
on Plaintiff’s trademark infringement and unfair competition 
claims. 
                                                          
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 1054–58. The court noted that “[e]ven if Defendants’ use were 
determined to be commercial, it would only infringe upon UTLM’s trademark 
rights if the use created a likelihood of confusion.” Id. at 1054; see 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). A determination of the likelihood of confusion involves 
six factors: 1) the degree of similarity between the marks; 2) the intent of the 
alleged infringer in using the mark; 3) evidence of actual confusion; 4) similar-
ity of products and manner of marketing; 5) the degree of care likely to be ex-
ercised by purchasers; and 6) the strength or weakness of the marks. Id. at 
1055; see Sally Beauty Co., Inc. v. Beutyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 2002). 
In addition, the Tenth Circuit noted that “[p]arody is another factor to consid-
er in determining the likelihood of confusion.” 527 F.3d at 1055. 
 272. Id. (quoting Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 
1486 (10th Cir.1987)) (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). 
 273. Id. at 1056. 
 274. Id. at 1056–57. The court also noted that “[a] parody adopts some fea-
tures of the original mark, but relies upon a difference from the original mark 
to produce its desired effect.” Id. at 1057; see Jordache Enters., 828 F.2d at 
1486 (“An intent to parody is not an intent to confuse.”); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. 
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) (con-
fusing parodies are “vulnerable under trademark law”); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. 
Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1987) (confusing parodies 
“implicate . . . the legitimate commercial and consumer protection objectives of 
trademark law”). 
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In reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiff’s ACPA claims,275 the 
Tenth Circuit noted that UTLM had failed to prove that UTAH 
LIGHTHOUSE was distinctive at the time Wyatt registered his 
domain names.276 However, it found that “. . . utahligh-
thouse.com and utahlighthouse.org [were] virtually identical to 
the trademark with the minor exceptions of spacing between 
‘Utah’ and ‘Lighthouse,’ and the addition of the .com and 
.org.”277 The Tenth Circuit further found that Wyatt’s website 
constituted a fair use “[b]ecause Wyatt’s parody offer[ed] an in-
direct critique and lack[ed] an overt commercial purpose.”278 
Therefore, it concluded that Wyatt had not acted with a bad 
faith intent to profit, following “the reasoning of several other 
courts that a website that critiques a product and uses the 
product’s trademark as the website’s domain name may be a 
fair use.”279 In addition, the ACPA’s safe harbor exception fur-
ther shielded Defendants from liability because “Defendants 
could have reasonably believed that use of the domain name [in 
a parodic website] was legal.”280 Thus, the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in De-
fendants’ favor on Plaintiff’s ACPA claim.281 
                                                          
 275. To prevail on its ACPA claim, UTML had to demonstrate “(1) that its 
trademark, UTAH LIGHTHOUSE, was distinctive at the time of registration 
of the domain name; (2) that the domain names registered by Wyatt . . . are 
identical or confusingly similar to the trademark; [and] (3) that Wyatt used or 
registered the domain names with a bad faith intent to profit.” Utah Ligh-
thouse, 527 F.3d at 1057. 
 276. Id. at 1051. 
 277. Id. at 1057–58. 
 278. Id. at 1058. 
 279. Id.; see Lucas Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806, 
809 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that consumer registering domain name “lucas-
nursery.com” and complaining about nursery’s work was not liable under 
ACPA); TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that a 
website with the purpose of informing other consumers did not create the 
harm the ACPA intended to eliminate); Mayflower Transit, L.L.C. v. Prince, 
314 F. Supp. 2d 362 (D.N.J. 2004) (finding no ACPA liability where Defendant 
registered “mayflowervanline.com” since the totality of the circumstances 
demonstrated that registrant’s motive was to express dissatisfaction in doing 
business with the mark’s owner). 
 280. Utah Lighthouse, 527 F.3d at 1059. The ACPA’s safe harbor exception 
provides that no bad faith intent can be found if “the court determines that the 
person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the do-
main name was a fair use or otherwise lawful.” See 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 281. Utah Lighthouse, 527 F.3d at 1059. 
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I.  ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
In Southern Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Company, Plain-
tiff Southern Grouts & Mortars (Southern) sued Defendant 3M 
Company (3M), a competitor in the swimming pool finishing 
industry.282 Southern owned the trademark “DIAMOND 
BRITE,” but 3M had earlier registered the 
www.diamondbrite.com domain name.283 Like Southern, 3M al-
so had trademark rights in the DIAMOND BRITE mark but 
only in connection with “electronically controlled display panels 
and signs,” not pool products.284 Even though 3M’s trademark 
rights in the DIAMOND BRITE mark expired, 3M continued 
its re-registration of the www.diamondbrite.com domain 
name.285 The website at that domain briefly displayed content 
but ceased doing so after April 2002.286 3M defended its re-
registration of the domain name, explaining that it wanted “to 
avoid the risk that a competitor of its . . . products would use it 
to create consumer confusion as to the source of its products.”287 
Southern, which registered and used www.diamondbrite.cc for 
its business, subsequently sued 3M for ACPA and unfair com-
petition violations.288 The district court awarded summary 
judgment for 3M, finding that Southern had failed to show that 
3M had a bad faith intent to profit from its use of the 
DIAMOND BRITE mark and failed to show that 3M used the 
mark in commerce and failed to produce sufficient evidence of a 
likelihood of confusion.289 
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit analyzed each of the 
ACPA’s nine bad-faith-intent-to-profit factors and found that 
five of them weighed in 3M’s favor, two of them weighed in 
Southern’s favor, and the remaining two factors, including the 
fair use factor, did not apply.290 The Court noted that the Se-
                                                          
 282. Southern Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Company, 575 F.3d 1235, 1238 
(11th Cir. 2009). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 1239. 
 287. Id. at 1238. 
 288. Southern’s unfair competition claims against 3M were based upon 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(a). Id. 
 289. Id. at 1243, 1249. The additional basis for the district court’s award of 
summary judgment in 3M’s favor was the court’s finding that Southern’s 
ACPA claims were barred by laches. Id. 
 290. The Eleventh Circuit found that the third, fifth, sixth, seventh, and 
eighth factors weighed in 3M’s favor. The first and ninth factors weighed in 
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nate Report which accompanied the ACPA was silent “about 
those who hold onto a domain name to prevent a competitor 
from using it.”291 The Court concluded that Southern had “not 
established that 3M had any intention to profit from the di-
amondbrite.com website” and affirmed the district court’s 
award of summary judgment in 3M’s favor on the ACPA 
claim.292 
V.  WHY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
SHOULD INTERPRET THE FAIR USE DEFENSE OF FREE 
SPEECH OR PARODY UNDER THE ACPA. 
Since the ACPA’s enactment in 1999, only a handful of fed-
eral appellate courts have decided ACPA cases involving a fair 
use defense asserted by an alleged cybersquatter.  While few in 
number, these decisions have resulted in inconsistent criteria 
regarding the standard as to when a fair use defense of free 
speech or parody will defeat an ACPA claim. Although the 
United States Supreme Court has previously decided trade-
mark infringement cases,293 it has yet to grant a petition for a 
writ of certiorari in a single ACPA case.294 At least one party 
has unsuccessfully petitioned the Court to grant it a writ of cer-
                                                          
Southern’s favor. As to the second factor, the court found that it was inapplic-
able to the case because “diamondbrite.com [was] not the legal or identifying 
name of a person.” It found the fourth factor to be inapplicable as well because 
the diamondbrite.com domain name was not used for comparative advertising, 
criticism, comment, or parody purposes. Id. at 1249. 
 291. Id. at 1248. 
 292. Id. at 1247. Because the Eleventh Circuit found that Southern had 
failed to produce sufficient evidence that 3M acted with a bad faith intent to 
profit, it did not address the district court’s finding that Southern’s ACPA 
claim was barred by laches. Id. at 1249. 
 293. See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 
543 U.S. 111 (2004);  Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003);  
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Hustler Magazine v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 294. By statute, the United States Supreme Court may review a case from 
a federal court of appeals when it grants a writ of certiorari upon the request 
of any party in a civil case. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 provides that the United States 
Supreme Court may review cases from the federal appellate courts on either of 
the following grounds: (1) “[b]y writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of 
any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or 
decree; and (2) [b]y certification at any time by a court of appeals of any ques-
tion of law in any civil or criminal case as to which instructions are desired, 
and upon such certification the Supreme Court may give binding instructions 
or require the entire record to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in 
controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2008). 
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tiorari in an ACPA case.295 As described below, the time is ripe 
for the United States Supreme Court to interpret the standard 
of when the fair use defense of free speech or parody will prec-
lude a finding of liability under the ACPA. 
The inconsistent criteria articulated by the circuit courts 
on the ACPA’s fair use defense is most evident in the Fourth 
and Tenth Circuits.  In the 2008 case of Utah Lighthouse Min-
istry v. Foundation for Apologetic Information and Research, 
the Tenth Circuit held that in order for a parody to be consi-
dered a “fair use” and defeat an ACPA claim, it must: (1) not 
cause a likelihood of public confusion as to the source of the 
mark;296 and (2) be immediately apparent to anyone visiting 
the parodic website that it was not the trademark owner’s web-
site due to the differences in context.297 However, the criteria 
from other circuits courts was not whether the website’s content 
immediately conveyed to a viewer that it was the not the 
trademark owner’s website. Rather, at least one circuit court 
has held that the key issue is whether the domain name itself 
conveys that it is a parody.298 
For example, the Fourth Circuit’s criteria for determining 
whether something is a parody, and thus can be considered a 
fair use, is whether the domain name at issue conveys two si-
multaneous, yet contradictory, messages.  First, that it is the 
original.  Second, that it is not the original and is, instead, a 
parody.299 In People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. 
                                                          
 295. Sporty’s Farm, L.L.C. unsuccessfully sought a writ of certiorari from 
the United States Supreme Court.  Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Sporty’s 
Farm, L.L.C., v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2000) (No. 99-1752) 
2000 WL 34013464, cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262 (2000). In its petition, Sporty’s 
Farm argued that the Second Circuit, the first federal appellate court to in-
terpret the ACPA had “committed two errors.” First, the Second Circuit had 
improperly substituted its factual finding for those of the district court under a 
set of standards, specifically the ACPA, not in effect at the time the district 
court issued it decision. Second, it argued that the Second Circuit had impro-
perly taken Sporty’s Farm’s property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. 
 296. Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. and Research, 
527 F.3d 1045, 1055 (10th Cir. 2008)  (quoting Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg 
Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
 297. Id. The Tenth Circuit noted that “[t]he district court [properly] deter-
mined that the Wyatt website was a parody because it would be immediately 
apparent to anyone visiting the Wyatt website that it was not the UTLM web-
site due to the differences in content.” Id. at 1056–1057 (emphasis added). 
 298. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 
359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell 
Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
 299. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Doughney, the Fourth Circuit rejected Doughney’s argument in 
which he asked the court to “consider his website [at 
www.peta.org] in conjunction with the domain name 
[www.peta.org] because, together, they purportedly parody 
PETA.”300 The Fourth Circuit found that Doughney’s 
www.peta.org domain name conveyed the first message (that it 
was the original) but that “the second message [that it was not 
the original but is instead a parody, was] conveyed only when 
the viewer read[] the content of the website.”301 Because “an in-
ternet user would not realize that they were not on an official 
PETA web site until after they had used PETA’s mark to access 
the web page ‘www.peta.org,’ ” the Fourth Circuit held that 
Doughney’s use of www.peta.org was not a parody and found 
him liable for violating the ACPA.302 Such criteria conflicts 
with the criteria rendered by the Tenth Circuit. 
There also appears to be an inconsistency within the 
Fourth Circuit itself as to the standard for the fair use defense 
in an ACPA case. For example, given the Fourth Circuit’s crite-
ria above in PETA, if a parody relies on a user visiting a web-
site to determine whether he or she is on an official website 
sponsored by a mark holder, then alleged cybersquatter, Chris-
topher Lamparello, in Lamparello v. Falwell, should have lost. 
Instead, the Fourth Circuit entered summary judgment in fa-
vor of Lamparello even though Lamparello registered the do-
main name, www.fallwell.com and created a website at that 
domain to criticize Reverend Jerry Falwell.303 Certainly, the 
                                                          
 300. Id. at 366. 
 301. Id. at 367. While Doughney argued that his website content delivered 
the second required message needed to successfully constitute a parody, the 
Fourth Circuit disagreed, stating that it is the domain name (and not the web-
site content) which must convey the first and second simultaneous, yet contra-
dictory, messages. Id. at 366; see also Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. 
Supp. 2d 1125, 1134–35 (D. Colo. 2000) (contending that defendant’s use of 
plaintiffs’ mark in domain name “does not convey two simultaneous and con-
tradictory messages” because “[o]nly by reading through the content of the 
sites could the user discover that the domain names are an attempt at paro-
dy”); Planned Parenthood Federation of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 97 Civ. 0629, 1997 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997), aff’d, No. 97-7492, 
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22179 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 1998) (rejecting the parody de-
fense because “[s]eeing or typing the ‘planned parenthood’ mark and accessing 
the web site are two separate and nonsimultaneous activities”). 
 302. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 366–67 (quot-
ing Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 921). 
 303. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 322 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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domain name www.fallwell.com appears to convey the message 
that it is the original. However, it does not convey the second 
message, that it is not the original but instead is a parody. Only 
after one visited the website content at www.fallwell.com could 
one determine that Lamparello intended to use 
www.fallwell.com as a parody.304  Therefore, under the Fourth 
Circuit’s criteria in PETA, Lamparello’s use of 
www.fallwell.com should not have been determined to be a fair 
use, and he should have been held liable for cybersquatting. In-
stead, Lamparello prevailed in the Fourth Circuit.305 
Similarly, under the Fourth Circuit’s criteria in PETA, the 
alleged cybersquatter in the Tenth Circuit case of Utah Ligh-
thouse Ministry should have lost, but instead he prevailed.306  A 
user might very well be aware of the UTAH LIGHTHOUSE 
mark, see the www.utahlighthouse.org domain name, and rea-
sonably believe that if he or she typed in the domain name, he 
or she would be visiting a website sponsored by, or affiliated 
with, UTAH LIGHTHOUSE.  Only after arriving at the 
www.utahlighthouse.org website would a viewer actually real-
ize that it was not a UTAH LIGHTHOUSE website, but instead 
was a parody. 
This Article has exposed the inconsistent criteria articu-
lated by the circuit courts as to when the fair use defense of 
free speech or parody will defeat an ACPA claim. Given these 
inconsistencies, which have the ability to impact the fair use 
defenses in broader trademark arenas, the United States Su-
preme Court should interpret the standard as to when a fair 
use defense of free speech or parody will preclude a finding of 
liability under the ACPA. 
 
                                                          
 304. Id. at 318. 
 305. Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 322. 
 306. Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. and Research, 
527 F.3d 1045, 1059 (10th Cir. 2008). 
